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DEFENDING THE JURYS TERRITORY
I. INTRODUCTION: THE JURY IN THE SPOTLIGHT
Public disenchantment with the criminal justice system increas-
ingly centers on the jury. Sensational stories, like the Simpson,
King,1 and Menendez2 trials, undermine the legitimacy of jury ver-
dicts and call into question the compatibility of the institution with
the ideal of the rule of law. Such controversial verdicts have prompted
reforms to limit the jury's power and to restructure the jury system.3
While the parade of celebrity trials attracts the spotlight,4 1.2 million
people participate in jury deliberations each year, and they generally
reach a verdict that the presiding judge considers correct. 5 Moreover,
rather than subverting legality,6 the jury nurtures it by allowing for
community input within the framework of the rule of law, and by link-
ing the public to the institution of the courts.
1. See Thomas M. Riordan, Note, Copping an Attitude: Rule of Law Lessons from
the Rodney King Incident, 27 Loy. LA. L. REv. 675 (1994).
2. See Alan Abrahamson, Lyle Menendez Case Ends in Mistrial; D.A. to Retry Broth-
ers, L.A. TnnEs, Jan. 29, 1994, at Al.
3. See, e.g., Laura Mansnerus, Rewriting the Rules of the Jury System: Unpopular
Verdicts Feed a Belief That the Process Doesn't Work, N.Y. Timms, Nov. 4, 1995, at
A7 (discussing public distrust of the jury and the reforms proposed in response).
4. STEPBEN J. ADLE, Tm JuRY. TRIAL AND ERROR iN HE A-RICAN CouRTRoom 44-
45 (1994)("[T]he U.S. mass media's intense interest in court cases guarantees
that any apparent misstep by any jury in any big case will receive immediate
national attention and feed our sense of pessimism and disappointment."). Id. at
46. ("M[T]he jury surely owes some of its Cubs-like reputation to its dismal per-
formance in these few extraordinary cases.").
5. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AAmRICAN JURY 420-30 (1966)
(reporting that in only nine percent of all cases is the judge critical of the jury's
performance); RrrA J. SMION, THE JURY: ITS ROLE iN A1AmcAN SocmiTY 23 (1980)
(stating that "decisions by juries properly instructed... are better than decisions
by a single judge") (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Charles Joiner); Interview
with Judge William Huss, The Superior Court of Los Angeles County (January 9,
1994). It is also important to note that only five to fifteen percent of all federal
criminal cases reach a jury trial, and at least eighty percent of those trials result
in convictions. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra (reporting that 15 percent of criminal
dispositions are jury trials); JAIEs P. LEViNE, JURIEs AND PoLrrIcs 34 (1992)
(placing the number of felony cases resolved through jury trials at five percent).
See also, JEFFREY ABRAMiSON, WE, THE JURY: SYSTEm AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOC-
RAcY 298 n.4 (1994) (reporting that the National Center for State Courts calcu-
lated in 1988 that jury trials constitute only 2.9 percent of all criminal
dispositions, including both felonies and misdemeanors); id. at 253 (reporting
that in 1990, the jury conviction rate actually surpassed the conviction rate in
bench trials) (citing ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 204, Tbl.
D7).
6. See LEVNE, supra note 5, at 745 (defining an attitude of legality as the tendency
"to obey the parameters set by the legal order").
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The jury system operates under a complex mandate: Jurors must
affirm that laws appear legitimate to the community,7 protect the in-
terests of individual defendants, and strive for an accurate verdict.
The jury, like the rule of law, negotiates the "tolerable accommodation
of the conflicting interests of society."S Where the jury sacrifices de-
grees of certainty, it also enhances flexibility and individualized jus-
tice; when public condemnation of an individual influences a verdict,
the individual suffers, but there is a corresponding gain in community
cohesion and the perceived legitimacy of the system. Many verdicts
generate criticism about the balance the jury strikes between these
competing interests. To those most concerned about the harm to the
community, a jury that fails to convict an unpopular defendant ap-
pears unjust. Because the jury's consideration of the evidence is medi-
ated through an adversarial process, fairness to the individual does
not always produce the result the public expects. The jury represents
the public's interests, but the deliberative process also tempers the
anger and fear of the community and protects individual defendants
from hasty judgments.
The language used by both critics and defenders of the jury system
reveals tensions between democratic values and countermajoritarian
fears of tyranny by the people. William Blackstone called the jury
"the palladium of liberty,"9 Thomas Jefferson deemed it the touch-
stone of our peace and safety,O and Patrick Devlin praised it as "the
lamp that shows that freedom lives.""l But critics of the jury empha-
size its tensions with founding principles like the rule of law rather
than its compatibility with democratic foundations like liberty and
equality. Judge Jerome Frank considered the jury incompetent,
prejudiced, and lawless.12 He cited jurors as obstacles to legal cer-
tainty because they apply "laws they don't understand to facts they
7. See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 7 ([T]he legitimacy of the law depends on accept-
ance by the people. And the jury today remains our best tool for ensuring that
the law is being applied in a way that wins people's consent.").
8. LEvnm, supra note 5, at 83 (quoting Judge Learned Hand).
9. WILLIAM BLACxSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 350 (Cooley
ed., 1899).
10. See SEYMOUR WISHmAN, ANATOMY OF A JURY: THE SYSTEM ON TRIAL vii (1986).
The jury is also uniquely American. More than 80 percent of all criminal jury
trials in the world take place in the United States. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note
5, at 13.
11. Sm PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL By JURY 164 (1956).
12. Judge Frank specifically opposed the general verdict, which he believed masked
jurors' incompetence. JEROME FRANc, COURTS ON TRIAL: MyTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949). Judge Frank feared the jury's "infinite capacity for
mischief, for twelve men can easily misunderstand more law in a minute than the
judge can explain in an hour." VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VmAR, JUDGING THE
JURY 115 (1986) (quoting Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1948)).
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can't get straight."'s Judge Frank responded to the champions of the
jury system's democratic origins that what "was apparently a bulwark
against an arbitrary tyrannical executive, is today the quintessence of
governmental arbitrariness .... If anywhere we have a 'government
of men,' in the worst sense of that phrase, it is in the operations of the
jury system."14
Although some of our romantic ideals about jury service are mythi-
cal,15 many popular criticisms of the jury are also misguided. Jury
verdicts give effect to beliefs held by a substantial portion of the pub-
lic. When those beliefs are deemed illegitimate, efforts at change
should focus not on the jury system, but on the underlying sources of
the disjunction. Moreover, when the jury appears to falter, forces be-
yond its control often cause the failure. It is only the most visible com-
ponent of a complex system, and criticisms of the jury reflect failings
in other workings of the court as well. The public, however, takes a
results-oriented view of the law, and "clues to the legitimacy of courts
are not to be found in the structure of doctrine, or in the formal texts
of jurists, but in the broad messages traveling back and forth between
the public and the organs of popular culture."16 Popular culture por-
trays the criminal justice system as an obstacle course of legal rules
that prevent police and prosecutors from doing their jobs. Because of
both fictional depictions and the increasing coverage of real cases,
many believe that all defendants have the opportunity to go to court
and that high profile jury trials constitute typical cases.17
The jury system lies at the heart of our democratic system, but it
has lost much of its moral authority in the popular legal culture.' 8 In
this essay, I will consider two recent books on the jury that discuss
why practitioners and the public both celebrate and condemn it. I will
also examine how the jury functions as a policymaking body within
13. FRANK, supra note 12, at 132.
14. Id. See also KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 20 (quoting an attack on the jury
in the American Bar Association Journal in 1924: "Too long has the effete and
sterile jury system been permitted to tug at the throat of the nation's judiciary as
it sinks under the smothering deluge of the obloquy of those it was designed to
serve.").
15. See, e.g., TWELVE ANGRY MEN (depicting a jury holdout struggling with fellow
jurors toward the just rather than the obvious verdict).
16. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579,
1605 (1989).
17. David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court T.V., Conventional Television,
and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 785,
788 (1993)("Adjudication occupies only one point on the continuum of the crimi-
nal process, but the rest of the process is invisible on Court TV.").
18. See Maura Dolan, Judging the Jury System: Jury System Is Held in Low Regard
by Most, L.A. TziEs, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al (reporting that 55 percent of Los Ange-
les County residents have "only some or very little" confidence in the jury system,




the criminal justice system, and preview reforms that might respond
to criticisms about the jury's conformity to the rule of law. Despite
condemnations of the system, polls show that past criminal jurors,
lawyers, and judges report much higher levels of confidence in the jury
than outsiders to the criminal justice system.19 Jeffrey Abramson's
book, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy, may
explain why those who have served feel confident that the deliberative
process in the jury room produces fair results. Stephen Adler's scru-
tiny of seemingly indefensible verdicts in The Jury: Trial and Error in
the American Courtroom explains why those "outside" the jury system
do not trust it.
II. DEMOCRATIC IDEALS
The direct and raw character of jury democracy makes it our most honest
mirror, reflecting both the good and the bad that ordinary people are capable
of when called upon to do justice. The reflection sometimes attracts us, and it
sometimes repels us. But we are the jury, and the image we see is our own. 2 0
In We, The Jury, Jeffrey Abramson examines the intersection be-
tween the development of the jury system and changes in the demo-
cratic process. 21 He locates the conflicting perceptions of the jury in
the essential contradictions of democracy,22 and sees the criticisms
surrounding the jury system as an indictment of democracy itself.23
The jury wagers the most on "democracy's core claim that the people
make their own best governors."24 Abramson starts with the paradox
that now that the jury has ceased to be an entirely elite institution
and might realize its full representative promise, that democratiza-
tion has provoked a "crisis of confidence in the quality and accuracy of
jury verdicts."25 He explores "what the jury teaches us about our-
19. Id. at A18 (reporting that while only 39 percent of all Los Angeles County resi-
dents say they have confidence in the jury system, 54 percent of past criminaljurors responded that they trust the system).
20. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 250.
21. He identifies the goal of his book as a "sustained study of the changing demo-
cratic ideals and values embedded in our jury practices." Id. at 7.
22. Abramson uses Medgar Evers as an example of how the jury system brings out
both the best and the worst in our society. Id. at 1 n.1 (explaining that "[oin
February 5, 1994, a generation after two all-white juries had deadlocked on
charges that Byron De La Beckwith had murdered the Mississippi civil rights
leader in 1963, a racially mixed jury finally convicted De La Beckwith of Evers'
murder.").
23. "To resent the intrusion of such popular conceptions of justice into the judicial
process now strikes me as a resentment against democracy." Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 2. He compares this commitment to "the hedged bet that most of our insti-
tutions of representative democracy make on the people." Id.
25. Id. at 3.
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selves and our capacity for self-governance," 26 and reclaims a deliber-
ative model of jury decisionmaking.
To resurrect a positive view of the jury, Abramson focuses on "the
crucial difference between two understandings of the jury's role in a
democracy."2 7 At the core of We, The Jury lies the ideal of a delibera-
tive jury rather than a representative one. Abramson defines the rep-
resentative theory as a model "where jurors act as spokespersons for
competing group interests."28 In a deliberative model, "power flows to
arguments that persuade across group lines and speak to a justice
common to persons drawn from different walks of life."29 Throughout
the book Abramson portrays and defends the jury as a deliberative
body. He praises the shift from elite to diverse juries, for example, but
criticizes the emphasis on interest group politics injury selection. Ab-
ramson argues that the distinctive "genius of the jury system has been
to emphasize deliberation more than voting and representation," and
he highlights each recent development that signals the ascendance of
the representative model.3 0 The representative view of the jury un-
dermines rule of law ideals because rigid adherence to demographic
balance creates the impression that cases stand or fall on the jurors
rather than the merits. Neither democracy nor the jury, however, suc-
ceeds merely by "brokering justice among irreconcilably antagonistic
groups."3 1
Each chapter of We, The Jury chronicles the decline of the delibera-
tive ideal in jury process and urges a reconception of the jury with
deliberation as its foundation. Voting is a secondary activity for the
deliberative jury; a jury decision represents "more than an average of
the verdict preferences of six or twelve citizens."32 Abramson charac-
terizes the jury as "the last, best refuge" of the connection among de-
mocracy, deliberation, and the collective wisdom of ordinary people.3 3
He argues for a renewed deliberative ideal of the jury, but he is not
naive about its limitations: "To get the jury that resists the tyranny of
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 205.
31. Id.
32. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAw & CommMp.
PnoMs. 205, 206 (1989). Ellsworth asserts that the jury's final understanding "is
more complete and more accurate than any of the separate versions that contrib-
uted to it, or indeed than their average. This transcendent understanding is the
putative benefit of the deliberation process." Id.
33. Id. at 11. The deliberative ideal dates back to Aristotle's suggestion that democ-




the state, we must risk our freedom on the jury that practices its own
petty tyranny."3 4
A. Balancing Knowledge and Impartiality
In the section entitled "Democratic Knowledge," Abramson traces
the historical evolution of the jury from the colonial, active body to the
contemporary, passive one. The shift occurred as the political climate
of the country changed and more complicated conceptions of commu-
nity and representation developed. 35 The jury now serves as the "con-
science" of an increasingly complex "community." In the change from
an intimate institution to a distant arbiter of impartial justice, Ab-
ramson suggests that the premium on impartiality became a mandate
for ignorant jurors. Although he does not argue for a resurrection of
jurors as witnesses and investigators in the trial, he chronicles the
origins of the jury as a truly local institution in the colonies to "re-
trieve a vision of jury deliberation enriched by the ability of local ju-
rors to know the context in which events on trial took place."SG Jury
trials under this model "gave local residents, in moments of crisis, the
last say on what was law in their community."3 7
The argument for local juries holds that jurors can contribute valu-
able knowledge about the harm done to the community without bring-
ing prejudicial preconceptions of the defendant into deliberations.
The search for a local but impartial jury highlights the inherent ten-
34. Id. at 5. Abramson acknowledges the major criticisms of the jury system before
undertaking a historical and practical defense of the institution:
o The jury substitutes the rule of the people for the rule of law; but 'justice is not
always popular and the conscience of the community is not always pure."
o The gap between the complexity of cases and the qualifications ofjurors contin-
ues to widen.
o The quest for demographic balance resembles interest group politics.
" The jury can be unpredictable and susceptible to emotion and prejudice.
o The jury acts as a "pseudodemocracy" that ignores the democratically elected
legislature. Id. at 3-4.
35. See Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is An Impartial Juror in the Age of
Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. Rv. 631, 663 (1991)("Villages and towns have given
way to cities and sprawling metropolises. Yet through the vast expansion of the
media and the proliferation of communications technologies, we once again fre-
quently know what is going on in our communities. In fact, we almost certainly
know more about notorious cases than did our twelfth century predecessors.").
36. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 22. In the debate preceding the Bill of Rights, anti-
Federalists pursued the idea of selecting juries from the "vicinage" where the
crime occurred. Abramson explains that the anti-Federalist insistence on local
juries grew out of the "colonial experience in using juries to resist the Crown." Id
at 23. Both John Hancock and John Peter Zenger, for example, benefited from
jury defiance. Id. at 24-25. Eventually, the Founders reached a compromise be-
tween the Federalist preference for enlarging the geography of justice and the
anti-Federalist adherence to the local jury ideal: The 1789 amendment provides
for juries from the "district," which is some unit smaller than the state. Id. at 35.
37. Id. at 25.
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sions between the defendant's interest in fairness and the commu-
nity's interest in participation.3S The Sixth Amendment 39 represents
a compromise between the competing visions of the jury as both the
property of the community and the protector of the defendant. An
ideal of jury impartiality that can be achieved only by disqualifying
the best-informed members of the community, however, does not in-
spire confidence in the accuracy of jury verdicts. The decline in public
perceptions of the legitimacy of the jury represents the cost of the shift
to an ideal encompassing emptiness. 40 In a recent Wall Street Jour-
nal editorial, Walter Olson expressed the widespread perception that
the jury is selected for its incompetence. He declared that the "jury is
the Queen Bee of the American legal system, reputedly all-powerful
but in practice immobilized, groomed and force-fed by a swarm of
functionaries."41 Olson states that jury selection today ensures that
"a panel in no way reflects the views and expertise that might be
found in a random cross section of the population."42
Abramson agrees that the recent insistence on an impartial jury
creates a false opposition between well-informed jurors and fair-minded jurors. A founding ideal of the jury system is that the judg-
ments it renders should be informed by life experiences, but Abram-
son concludes that increased emphasis on the juror as a blank slate
has undermined the jury's role as the conscience of the community. To
Abramson, the "pejorative sound of 'local,' 'community,' or 'popular
justice is the sound of a jury system in crisis."43 He suggests a more
contextual analysis of impartiality in order to "insulate justice from
popular prejudice and yet leave it in the hands of the populace."44
38. Although the jury acts first as a body to resolve disputes, Abramson points out
that it also serves a secondary function of educating the community about the
law. Thomas Jefferson called the jury a "school by which [the] people learn the
exercise of civic duties as well as rights." Id. at 31 (citing SHANNON C. ST soN,
THE AI~ERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAw: ANGLO-AmERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
BEFORE JoHN UItsIAL 88 (1990)). De Tocqueville also remarked that the jury,
"by obliging men to turn their attention to other affairs than their own ... rubs
off that private selfishness which is the rust of society." Stephen Adler, 'Rigged
Juries?", ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 27, 1994, at D1 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville).
39. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed ..... U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
40. See A _RAMSON, supra note 5, at 37 (distinguishing impartiality from emptiness).
41. Walter Olson, The Jury-Selection Ordeal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at A19.
42. Id.
43. ABRAmSON, supra note 5, at 55.
44. Id. at 18. Abramson asks "how can the jury be at one and the same time an
instrument ofjustice (with all the insulation from popular pressure and local gos-
sip that doing the just thing' often requires) and an instrument of democracy
(with all the exposure to public opinion that doing the 'democratic thing' often
requires)?" Id. (emphasis added).
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Two sensational political trials from different eras of American his-
tory highlight the dilemma posed by these competing demands on the
jury: the trials of Aaron Burr45 and Oliver North.46 In Oliver North's
1989 trial, the court excused any juror who had seen North's congres-
sional testimony, effectively excluding jurors who were at all aware of
the world around them.47 In contrast, in Aaron Burr's trial in 1807,
only jurors who expressed a decisive opinion on an element of the
crime were disqualified.48 Chief Justice Marshall's vision of the ideal
jury in the Burr case differs markedly from the blank slate that courts
seek today. The Chief Justice made a clear distinction between pre-
trial information and a predisposition against considering the facts.49
The Burr court's acceptance of "light" versus "fixed" impressions, how-
ever, was not a lasting doctrine. By the late nineteenth century, jury
selection procedures prompted Mark Twain to object that "ignora-
muses alone could mete out unsullied justice."50 Although Abramson
advocates a return to Chief Justice Marshall's standard for contempo-
rary juries, today's electronic media saturate potential jurors with in-
formation and images that surpass any "light" impression Chief
Justice Marshall imagined. Contemporary trials operate under the
concept of presumed bias because of media immersion;51 to seat indi-
45. Former vice president Aaron Burr was indicted for treason and other, lesser of-
fenses on June 24, 1807. See id. at 38-40.
46. Oliver North was tried in 1989 on 12 charges of obstructing Congress, making
false statements, destroying documents, conspiring to defraud the government,
and receiving illegal gratuities. He ultimately was acquitted of nine charges and
convicted on three. The court of appeals vacated the convictions because his con-
gressional testimony might have been implicated in the verdict and remanded for
a retrial that never took place. See id. at 49-50.
47. The exclusions stemmed from the immunity that North was granted for his testi-
mony, but the case illustrates how jury selection in any high profile trial can lead
to the dismissal of jurors with even minimal awareness of current events.
48. Chief Justice John Marshall stated that he did not want to exclude "intelligent
and observing men whose minds were really in a situation to decide upon the
whole case according to the testimony." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51
(C.C.D. Va. 1807).
49. Chief Justice Marshall determined that the impartiality of a juror was not com-
promised by mere knowledge or even an opinion about the case, but only by
"those strong and deep impressions which will close the mind against the testi-
mony that may be offered in opposition to them." Joseph M. Hassett, A Jury's
Pre-Trial Knowledge in Historical Perspective: The Distinction Between Pre-Trial
Information and "Prejudicial" Publicity, 43 LAw AmD CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 162
(1980) (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)). See also
ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 44 (noting that the 12 men seated as jurors, despite
the pretrial information to which they had access, acquitted Burr).
50. ABRAM.SON, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting MARK TwAiN, ROUGHING IT 75 (1903)).
51. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 47. See also Hassett, supra note 49, at 156-157 (dis-
cussing the "undeviated rule" referred to in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
351 (1966), which holds that the jury's verdict must be based on "evidence and
argument in open court.")(citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)).
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viduals unaware of widely publicized cases, judges and lawyers must
pass over many potential jurors.
With the political and technological developments separating Oli-
ver North from Aaron Burr, "jury selection became wed to a flawed
understanding of impartiality in jurors."52 A national television audi-
ence had seen North testify before the Senate, and the court elimi-
nated jury venire members who admitted they were part of that
audience without any individual questioning about the level of their
exposure or the possible bias that resulted.53 The forewoman of the
North jury declared during voir dire that she did not watch the news
because she found it "depressing."54 In response to the selection of
jurors who were "congenitally somnolent in the world of govern-
ment,"55 the prosecution protested that the disqualification of all ju-
rors who were an active part of the community resulted in unfairness
to the "people's" interest in the trial.56 The prosecution's argument
recaptured the notion of the community's stake in informed resolution
of the conflict and demanded adequate consideration of that factor in
jury selection. According to the prosecution, the elimination of "people
... who have read something, heard something, seen something, or
talked to somebody" would "prejudice[ I the case against the govern-
ment at the start." Not all jurors "who are an integral part of the com-
munity, who participate in the community, who are part of what is
going on in the community and who stay informed" should be
disqualified.57
52. ABRAmasox, supra note 5, at 48.
53. See Fred Kaplan, North Jurors Won Seats with Blissful Ignorance, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1989, at 3 (stating that jury selection was skewed toward the
"disaffected and disinterested").
54. Olson, supra note 41, at A19.
55. See Bruce Fein, Uninformed Jurors Put Justice at Risk, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 9,
1989, at 8A (commenting that by disqualifying jurors from the Oliver North trial
who had seen any part of North's widely broadcast testimony, the judge was left
with jurors incompetent to serve their role: 'he miniscule remainder eligible for
jury service have either been understudies of Rip Van Winkle or congenitally
somnolent in the world of government."). Similarly, in the Cincinnati obscenity
prosecution over the Robert Mapplethorpe exhibit, the only juror who regularly
attended museums was dismissed for cause because her museum attendance was
an "unnecessary burden" on her objectivity. Olson, supra note 41, at A19.
56. Symposium, Panel Two: Current Judicial Practice, Legal Issues, and Existing
Remedies, 40 Aza. U. L. Rnv. 573, 581 (1991) [hereinafter Panel Two] (statement
of Jay Stephens). See also Hassett, supra note 49, at 155 (criticizing the selection
of jurors in the G. Gordon Liddy trial who had never heard of the Watergate
break-in).
57. Panel Two, supra note 56, at 581. Attorney Ronald Olson has made similar state-
ments: "[Clategorical elimination of people [who might have information bearing
on a case] is every bit as prejudicial as the elimination based on race." Id. at 578.
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The Court's description of the injury of discriminatory jury selec-
tion in Ballard v. United States5 8 supports the argument that both the
defendant and the community have an interest in the composition of
the jury: "The injury is not limited to the defendant-there is injury
to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at
large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts."59 To reconcile these competing interests, many commentators
recommend extensive voir dire of jurors who admit exposure to infor-
mation about a case, but counsel against excluding them perempto-
rily.6O As Chief Justice Marshall asserted in Aaron Burrs case,
recognition that a juror possesses information relating to a case is only
the beginning of the inquiry into her qualifications as a juror.6 1
Abramson argues that civic engagement not only signals an ability
to process information, but also is a prerequisite for representing the
community in jury deliberations. He acknowledges that the media
reach people with information about trials, but he makes a strong case
that jurors are capable of ignoring pretrial publicity in their delibera-
tions. Surprise acquittals, like those of John DeLorean, the police of-
ficers who beat Rodney King, and Mayor Marion Barry, attest to the
ability of jurors, for better or worse, to think independently. 62 In each
of these cases, the public had wide access to video images of the de-
fendants engaged in the crime.6 3 Judges also report that jurors rou-
tinely state that they are skeptical of what they read in the press or
hear on television.64
58. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
59. Id. at 195.
60. See Panel Two, supra note 56, at 583 (statement of Jay Stephens) ("[Alsk what
they have seen, what they have read, what their source of information was."). See
also James J. Gobert, Criminal Law, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CpGM.
L. 269, 311 (1988)(arguing that the court should focus on the "animus" of a juror
and eliminate her only if the information has compromised her ability to decide
the case fairly). It is important to note that the issue of pretrial publicity is rele-
vant in only a very small fraction of criminal cases. See Panel Two, supra note
56, at 593 (statement of Ronald Olson)("[I]n most instances, you could not get
newspaper or television coverage for a defendant if you paid for it ... it is only
available to the DeLoreans and to the Norths and to the Hazelwoods.).
61. See supra note 49.
62. See Minow & Cate, supra note 35, at 658-59 (challenging the association of "im-
partial" with "unaware" and explaining that people who are regularly exposed to
the media may have exactly the skills of discernment necessary to evaluate the
information they receive at trial).
63. See id. at 659 n.181 (citing CBS law correspondent Fred Graham's assertion after
the DeLorean trial that jurors are more swayed by evidence than fazed by public-
ity in sensational trials: Jurors "were not going to let someone like me tell them
what to think because I had been on television two and a half minutes on a few
nights when they had sat through six weeks of a trial.").
64. See, e.g., Panel Two, supra note 56, at 575 (statement of Judge Stanley Sporkin).
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Can courts conduct a contextual analysis of juror bias, and thereby
make a place at the jury table for people who would bring something
with them to the deliberations?65 The Sixth Amendment guarantees
a right to trial by an impartial jury, not by impartial jurors, 6 6 and
protecting that right does not depend on jurors with no opinions but
on the interaction of twelve different opinions in the deliberative pro-
cess. 67 The legitimacy of the jury depends both on its perceived im-
partiality and on the extent to which it reflects the collective wisdom
of the community. Abramson concludes this section by arguing for a
change in the standards of jury selection to end the folly of selecting
jurors "who somehow missed hearing what everyone else was talking
about."6s He argues for returning community values to the jury selec-
tion process, but faces the increasing difficulty of defining "commu-
nity." What does Oliver North's community look like, or O.J.
Simpson's? To answer that question, Abramson turns to the problem
of assembling a cross-sectional jury.
B. A Representative Jury
Just as Abramson criticizes the conflation of impartiality and igno-
rance, he separates impartiality from demographics. In the section on
"Democratic Representation," Abramson considers the kind of group
representation that constitutes a fair cross section69 and questions
whether color blind deliberation is possible.70 He defends the cross-
sectional ideal to the extent that it aims at enriched deliberation
across group lines, but criticizes it where it recommends mere propor-
tional representation of group differences. According to his theory, ju-
rors can bring diverse experiences to the jury room without adhering
to a constituency view of voting on the verdict. When jurors merely
stand in for interest groups, they "could just as well mail in their
verdict."71
65. See Anna Quindlen, We The Jury, Tns DENVER POST, June 9, 1994, at D4 (stat-
ing, after being dismissed from a jury panel for "bringing too much to the table,"
that there should be "coffee every day, and newer magazines, and a place at the
table for people, like juror 30892, who bring too much to it").
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Minow & Cate, supra note 35, at 659.
67. Minow & Cate, supra note 35, at 659 (stating that the right to an impartialjury is
protected by the "rough and tumble interaction of twelve members of the
community").
68. ABRAmsoN, supra note 5, at 55.
69. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ("It is part of the established tradi-
tion in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body
truly representative of the community.").
70. ABRAmsON, supra note 5, at 10 ("How do we reconcile the ideal that justice is
blind to a defendant's demographic features with realities of prejudice that make
it obvious that the demographic composition of the jury matters?").
71. Id. at 11.
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One model of the cross-sectional jury holds that jurors bear the di-
verse perspectives and interests of those with whom they share race,
religion, gender, and ethnic background. 72 Although no single jury
member can have a purely open mind, the representative jury none-
theless achieves "diffused impartiality" by balancing the biases of its
members against each other.73 Abramson argues, however, that an
impartial jury should not only reflect group interests but also subsume
those differences in the deliberative process. Just as he criticizes the
shift from impartiality to emptiness in jury selection, Abramson com-
pares the ideal of absorbing biases in the deliberative process to the
contemporary notion of representing those biases equally. The demo-
cratic, deliberative vision of the cross-sectional jury emphasizes the
enhanced quality of debate when diverse insights are brought to bear
on the evidence. Despite high profile failures,74 jurors can cross demo-
graphic boundaries to reach a verdict. Although Abramson does not
suggest specific standards for jury selection, he urges continued efforts
to "devise a jury system that defines our common values, not just our
different interests."75 The aspiration of group-blind deliberation may
outstrip the reality of some juries, but Abramson argues that it is a
goal worth pursuing and a possibility within reach.
Although the representative model is at the heart of most judicial
conceptions of jury composition,76 some early cases arguing for diver-
sity on the jury support Abramson's theory. Ballard v. United
States,77 for example, privileged deliberation over representation.
The Court concluded that regardless of the verdict, justice is devalued
when the "subtle play of influence" that results from including both
sexes on a jury is lost.78 In Taylor v. Louisiana,79 on the other hand,
the Court used rhetoric more focused on the representative function of
72. See id. at 100.
73. Id. at 101.
74. See, e.g., David Margolick, Tales of Racism on Simpson Jury, N.Y. Tnms, Apr. 14,
1995, at Al, A8 (The most-recently excused juror in the O.J. Simpson case has
painted for Judge Lance Ito a picture of a panel torn by racial tensions.").
75. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 104.
76. In Smith v. Texas, for example, Justice Black stated:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments
of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the com-
munity. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury
service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution
and the laws enacted under it, but is at war with our basic concepts of a
democratic society and a representative government.
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
77. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
78. Id. at 193-94 (The truth is that the two sexes are not fingible .... To insulate
the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet
a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.").
79. 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
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a cross section of the community.8 0 The male defendant in Taylor ap-
pealed his conviction for aggravated kidnapping, claiming that preju-
dice resulted from the underrepresentation of women in the jury pool.
The Court's ruling conflates impartiality with representation: "As
long as there are significant departures from the cross sectional goal,
biased juries are the result-biased in the sense that they reflect a
slanted view of the community they are supposed to represent."81 The
jury, according to the reasoning in Taylor, can best preserve public
confidence when it represents the mix of popular prejudices. The prin-
cipal virtue of the cross-sectional jury under this reasoning is not,
therefore, the richness of deliberations, but the "political function" of
legitimizing a verdict to divided segments of the community.8 2 The
cross-sectional principle represents the common view that different
groups have unique contributions to make to the jury, but the lan-
guage in Taylor reveals a narrow vision of what those unique contri-
butions are. Diversity, according to the Taylor Court, serves as a
counterweight to the inevitable biases of other jurors. A model that
focuses on adequate representation rather than informed deliberation,
however, enhances the appearance but not the substance of justice.
Abramson's discussion of the cross-sectional ideal highlights not
only the distinction between the jury's deliberative and representative
functions, but also the tension between attention to the community's
interest in representation and fairness and the defendant's interest in
a favorable jury. A diverse jury best represents the mixed perspec-
tives in most modern communities, but it conflicts with defense im-
pulses like Clarence Darrow's golden rule of jury selection: to seek
jurors "of the same sort" as the cient.83 A demographic cross-section
of jurors might not afford the defendant a strategic advantage, but
Darrow's rule overestimates the demographic variable in jury deci-
sionmalng. Because demographics account for only fifteen percent of
the variation in verdicts, many social scientists find such attempts to
predict the perfect jury to be "voodoo voir dire."84 Other factors like
mistrust of the police may play a more significant role injury decision-
making. For example, the Federal Public Defender's Office in Wash-
ington, D.C. reports that African American jurors vote to acquit
roughly the same percentage of Hispanic and white defendants as Af-
80. ABRMSON, supra note 5, at 118, 122.
81. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 n.7 (1975).
82. Id. (citing the "political function" of the jury).
83. Andrea Gerlin, Jury Pickers Rely Too Much on Demographics, WAL ST. J., Dec.
16, 1994, at B1.
84. Id. See also Shari Siedman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social
Scientists Know and Do Not Know, 73 JUDICATuRE 178, 181 (1990)(calling a selec-
tion process that promises an ideal jury "blatant voodoo").
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rican American ones.8 5 On the other hand, some verdicts clearly re-
flect the influence of demographics. The jury who initially acquitted
four white police officers of beating Rodney King included ten white
members and no African American jurors.8 6
Abramson insists that the "cross-sectional ideal understood as
merely a method for balancing group bias on the jury is an invitation
to jurors to abandon even the attempt to approach the evidence from a
disinterested point of view."8 7 He envisions the jury as "the common
conscience of the community and not just the register of our irreconcil-
able divisions."88 Abramson finds fault, therefore, with the social sci-
ence of jury selection, and he identifies the overselling of jury experts
as a cause of the declining faith in the jury.8 9 The popular image of
scientific selection suggests that wealthy litigants can "buy" a
favorable jury. Many experts conclude that scientific jury selection
basically constitutes benign "intuition made manifest."90 But tradi-
tional and highly suspect folklore about the behavior of jurors from
different groups has grown into a jury selection industry that threat-
ens the integrity of verdicts. Despite indicators that scientific selec-
tion is overrated,91 widespread criticism of it supports Abramson's
theory about the community's investment in the deliberative process.
85. Jeff Rosen, Jurymandering: A Case Against Peremptory Challenges, THE NE w
REPUBLmC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 15.
86. Id.
87. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 140.
88. Id. at 141.
89. See id. at 143. See also Maura Dolan, Judging the Jury System: Role of Jury
Consultants Controversial and Extensive, LA. Tzms, Sept. 26, 1994, at Al. Evi-
dence and arguments are more important than jury composition, and jury compo-
sition will make the most difference in a case where the evidence is ambiguous.
90. See AiBRAMSON, supra note 5, at 143 (quoting Stephen J. Alder, Litigation Science:
Consultants Dope Out the Mysteries of Jurors for Clients Being Sued, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 24, 1989, at Al); Dolan, supra note 89, at Al ("You can't stack a jury. You
can only unstack one.")(quoting Ronald Beaton, Director of Jury Consultation,
Forensic Technologies, Inc.).
91. See ABRAmSON, supra note 5, at 158; HANs & VmMAR, supra note 12, at 77 (re-
porting that some researchers have found that demographic variables only negli-
gibly correlate with verdicts); Hans Zeisel, Forward: The American Jury, 43 LAw
AN CoNTEmp. PROBs. 414 (1980)(counseling lawyers relying on scientific jury se-
lection to remember its spectacular failures like the mother of four conscientious
objectors holding out for conviction in the Harrisburg trial of the Berrigans) (cit-
ing J. NELSON & R. OsTow, THE FBI AND =H BERmGANS 297 (1972)). But see
Gobert, supra note 60, at 272 ("By converting what was an 'art' into a 'science,'
the social scientists increase the threat that a partial jury will be impaneled.
While in theory the advances in social science methodology could be used to fur-
ther the objective of impaneling an impartial jury, to date the opposite has proba-
bly occurred.").
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The public feels manipulated when lawyers control the participants in
deliberations.9 2
Even more troubling than the techniques of social scientists them-
selves is their tendency to exacerbate the inequality of resources in
the courtroom. Scientific jury selection arose to ensure that unpopu-
lar political defendants received a fair trial. Academics lent their
opinion polling and analysis services to anti-war protesters in a series
of cases beginning in 1972.93 Their success attracted entrepreneurs
with the goal of overmatching rather than equaling the government's
power, and large corporate defendants began to employ the techniques
to select favorable juries.9 4 The use of such research by wealthy cli-
ents raises ethical issues about buying favorable process. "Within the
adversarial process," according to Hans and Vidmar, "it is presumed
that each side will eliminate those prospective jurors most favorable
to the other side and that the end result will be an impartial jury."95
Yet when the adversaries possess unequal resources, the system is
"sorely tested."96 The use of scientific selection in the criminal contest
is even more troubling because the techniques not only widen the gulf
between rich and poor justice, but also undermine the community's
sense that they contribute to the proceedings. The political tech-
niques of polling and seating shadow juries heighten the perception
that jury selection tracks interest group vote tallying.9 7
Demographic variables both overlap and interact within the jury,
and they are not determinative. Abramson believes in the "fluid group
dynamics" of jury deliberation and in the possibility of an impartial
jury even if it is made up of individual jurors partial in their own
ways.98 Ultimately, Abramson acknowledges that jurors' back-
92. See HANs & VmmAR, supra note 12, at 93 (explaining that systematic selection
aimed at a favorable rather than an impartial jury undermines the legitimacy of
the trial and the resulting verdict). See also AnisAMSON, supra note 5 at 154 (stat-
ing that members of the community want to be "free moral agents"); ALAN M.
DERsHowrrz, Unsung Heroes-Juries Offer True Justice, in CoNTRARY TO Popu-
LAR OPINION 11, 12 (1992) ([D]esigner juries threaten to skew the randomness of
the jury and destroy its objectivity.").
93. See HANs & VmMAm, supra note 12, at 81-82 (describing the cases).
94. See ABRMViSON, supra note 5, at 149. There are now ten times as many jury con-
sultants as there were in 1982, and the 200 million dollar a year industry contin-
ues to grow. Id.
95. HANs & VmmA, supra note 12, at 93-94.
96. Id. at 94. The disparity of resources also raises questions about whether both
sides should have to disclose the results of their investigations of the jury pool.
97. Stephen Adler finds scientific jury selection even more invidious than Abramson
does. He compares it to product marketing that gives the jury "a psychological
craving to make the desired choice." ADLER, supra note 90, at A10. See also Ad-
ler, supra note 38, at D1 (stating that the jury system loses much of its moral
authority as a result of scientific selection).
98. See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 140. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,
234 (1978)(stating that "the counterbalancing of various biases is critical to the
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grounds and experiences influence their decisionmaking, but he does
not see those factors as either strong enough or static enough to "over-
whelm the force of evidence, make every member of an ethnic group
fungible with every other member of the same group, override per-
sonal dynamics, and make a science out of forecasting jury behav-
ior."99 Scientific jury selection attracts Abramson's censure, even
though he does not give it much credence, because it centrally chal-
lenges the ideal of a common justice cobbled together in deliberations.
He calls it "the kind of trial practice that undermines public confi-
dence in the jury system and teaches us to think of the other as repre-
senting someone else's justice."100 It represents the basic shift in our
conception of the jury from "a group that would find common ground
above individual differences to a group that divides, almost predict-
ably, along the fissures of identity in America."101 A purely represen-
tative model that masks division rather than seeking common ground
brings diminished closure to a trial.
C. Democratic Deliberation
Abramson maintains that expanding the power of the jury would
strengthen the legitimacy of jury verdicts. His most controversial
proposition is to explicitly allow juries to nullify the law.102 He argues
not only for better informed, more attentive, and more diverse jurors,
but for the opportunity for those jurors to judge the wisdom or justice
of the law they are asked to apply. Treating jurors as mechanically
obedient to instructions undermines confidence in their deliberations.
Abramson attributes the diminished powers of the jury after the coun-
accurate application of the common sense of the community to the facts of any
given case")(emphasis added). But see Gobert, supra note 60, at 279 (arguing
that "counterbalancing" will not necessarily produce an impartial jury because
some biases cannot be displaced, and conflicting biases do not cancel each other
out in a criminal trial that can end in a hung jury).
99. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 172.
100. Id. at 175. See also Marianne Constable, What Books About Juries Reveal About
Social Science and the Law, 16 LAw. & Soc. INQuIRY 353, 370 (1991)(stating that
jurors should represent "member[s] of a community of persons who share the
same law").
101. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 176.
102. See id. at 64 ("[Flor anyone who takes seriously the jury as a bridge between
community values and the law, jury nullification is a strong plank."). Jury nulli-
fication recognizes that 'jurors have the inherent right to set aside the instruc-
tions of the judge and to reach a verdict of acquittal based upon their own
consciences." Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 So.
CAL. L. REV. 168, 168 (1972). Only Indiana and Maryland currently provide for
jury nullification in their state constitutions. For a thorough discussion of jury
nullification in practice in Indiana and Maryland, see Alan Scheflin & Jon Van
Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAw AND CoNTrFMP.
PROBS. 51, 79-85 (1980). See also Part IV, infra (analyzing how jury nullification
relates to the role of jurors as policy makers).
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try's founding period both to the problematic ideal of impartiality and
to cases that by the end of the nineteenth century had ended the jury's
right to decide questions of law as well as questions of fact.1o3
Reviving jury nullification, according to Abramson, would fully re-
alize a commitment to the jury as the conscience of the community.1 0 4
His consistent goal is to "enlarge the space for jury deliberation," and
he advocates nuification to that end.105 A nullification instruction
presents more problems than Abramson acknowledges, however, be-
cause enlarging the space for jury deliberation actually might prevent
jurors from reaching agreement. Deliberation produces results be-
cause a group of strangers receives a set amount of information with
instructions to convince each other of the wisdom of a particular deci-
sion. Nullification, while always a possibility in extreme cases be-
cause of jury secrecy, might empower the fringe viewpoint if included
in the instructions. A nullification instruction could, therefore, inhibit
rather than enhance deliberation. Jury nullification still occurs when
a community clearly rejects a law, and juries reach uniform reluctance
to convict; but minimal reluctance should not lead to these unusual
103. The anti-Federalists argued that juries should have some say over deciding the
law because "[mien no longer cultivate, what is no longer useful.... Give them
power and they will find understanding to use it." ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 33
(quoting HERERT J. STORNG, THE CONPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 5:39 (1981)). The
Federalists retorted that the battle to allow juries to decide the law was first
fought before the representation of local views could be accomplished democrati-
cally in the legislature. Id.
104. The historical acquittal of William Penn for seditious preaching before an unlaw-
ful assembly is probably the most famous example of jury nullification in the
name of religious freedom. See ABRAmSON, supra note 5, at 70-71. See also M.
Kristine Creagan, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent Legislative Developments,
43 CAnS W. REs. 1101, 1104-1106 (describing the Penn trial and the subsequent
punishment of the jurors). In John Peter Zenger's trial, Alexander Hamilton also
argued that jurors ought "to see with their own eyes, to hear with their own ears,
and to make use of their consciences and understanding in judging of the lives,
liberties or estate of their fellow subjects." See ABRAisoN, supra note 5, at 74
(quoting JAms ALEXANDER, A BRmF NmrIvE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN
PETER ZENGER 93 (Stanley Katz, ed. 1963)). Also note Abramson's description of
the Camden draft records trial and the attorney's successful argument that the
jury must determine whether defendants are "deserving of the community's
scorn." ABRAsmsoN, supra note 5, at 59. Contemporary arguments for jury nullifi-
cation draw together otherwise dissonant political voices that agree juries should
decide whether to enforce unpopular laws. The Fully Informed Jury Association
(FIJA), for example, lobbies for laws protecting the right of nullification. ABRAm-
SON, supra note 5, at 59.
105. Even as he argues for a return to jury nullification, Abramson acknowledges its
ignoble history of injecting prejudice and racism into the process. ABRAMSON,
supra note 5, at 62 ("The Southern all-white jury became a shield for local racism
and a prime obstacle to enforcement of national civil rights legislation.... Once
we grant jurors the right to set conscience above law, we have to live with con-
sciences we admire as well as those we despise.")(emphasis added).
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decisions. Only in extraordinary cases should jurors reach legally in-
defensible verdicts.
Because nullification already takes place "in extreme cases of con-
flict between law and conscience,"1o6 Abramson's commitment to a for-
mal instruction is surprising. He argues that we should recognize in
theory what occurs in fact in order to have a fuller debate and openly
confront the biases buried in jury deliberations.107 Juries often nul-
lify not only by refusing to follow the judge's instructions, but by
reaching tenuous factual conclusions or erecting fictions around the
facts of the case in order to justify their decision. Jurors "smuggl[e]
their views on the justice of law into 'approved debate' about the evi-
dence or facts."08 Abramson suggests that an explicit instruction
would clear the process of these fictions. License from the judge would
allow the jury to identify and reject injustice directly rather than cir-
cumvent it by reaching incorrect factual conclusions that force their
desired result.1o9
The operation of jury nullification without an explicit instruction
helps maintain the rule of law because it signals rifts between the
community and the courts. But an explicit instruction on jury nullifi-
cation might diminish legality by fostering the perception that indi-
viduals can determine the boundaries of lawful conduct. Outright jury
nullification could place the victim at the mercy of the latest shifts in
public opinion, whereas the underground jury nullification that now
occurs protects the defendant from severe and obvious injustice but
does not encourage juries to blame an unpopular or unattractive vic-
tim.110 Abramson counters that pressuring jurors to convict against
their conscience damages the social fabric more seriously than al-
lowing them to nullify. He fears a chasm between law and popular
beliefs even though case after case illustrates that when that chasm is
dangerously wide, the jury will bridge it.
Although he argues for an escape hatch for jurors who want to nul-
lify, Abramson also states that juries should speak with one voice.
106. Id. at 64.
107. Id. at 67. Accord Creagan, supra note 104, at 1102 ("Regardless of one's personal
opinion of the concept of jury nullification, reality dictates that juries, in appro-
priate cases, are likely to nullify the law whether they are given permission to or
not. It seems practical, then, in light of the widespread support that jury nullifi-
cation has recently obtained and the reality of how juries behave, to draft legisla-
tion which will enable juries to fully perform their functions while,
simultaneously, keeping enough restraints on them to avoid 'anarchy.'").
108. ABRAmSON, supra note 5, at 67.
109. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 495 ("The jury, in the guise of resolving
doubts about the issues of fact, gives reign to its sense of values.").
110. While a nullification instruction permits juries to "leaven the law with lenience,"
Abramson recognizes that "the power to be lenient is the power to discriminate."
ABRAmSON, supra note 5, at 92 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312
(1987)).
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Unlike other democratic institutions, jury deliberations demand una-
nimity rather than majority rule. Political decisions do not always
provide a choice that transcends the assortment of interests that peo-
ple have."'l The decision on guilt or innocence, however, requires con-
sensus; in the ideal jury, individual views or reservations cannot be
outvoted and must be assimilated or accommodated. Unanimity re-
quires each member of the jury to persuade or be persuaded in turn.
The unanimous verdict therefore protects the minority presence on
the jury from tokenism.11 2 The Court has determined, however, that
nonunanimous verdicts do not necessarily alter the reliability of ver-
dicts or the character of deliberations.11 3 Unanimity sets the tenor of
deliberations and signals to the community that all the jurors are in
agreement about the verdict. Abramson suggests that the decline in
the unanimous verdict constitutes a move closer to the representative
model of tallying votes and away from the ideal of consensus.
In We, The Jury, Abramson makes explicit the arguments "over
democratic values we are already having when we argue about
whether the jury's peculiar marriage of justice and democracy works
for better or for worse."Z14 He asks, in the context of past and present
high profile trials, whether there is "one justice for jurors to render or
[ ] different justices for different groups?"'15 The deliberative ideal
places weighty demands on both the court and future jurors. It de-
pends on the premise that communities can find a shared justice at
the jury table. In the competing representative model, the demogra-
phy of the jury provides the key to verdicts and the system aspires
only to balance inherent biases. Abramson insists that disparate ex-
periences enrich conversation but do not control it.
Although the representative ideal is ascendant, Abramson offers
proposals to check that shift: abolishing peremptories, instructing on
111. See ABRPAaSON, supra note 5, at 182 ("Disagreement and dissent are the very stuff
of politics-in a democracy at least.").
112. See id. at 183-84 (If the jury depended on a bare majority "[fit would be... the
conduit through which all the factious feelings of the day would enter and con-
taminate justice at its source.")(quoting JoHN CALHoUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOV-
EENmENT 51 (1979)).
113. See Part V, infra (citingApodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Loui-
siana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)); ABRAmsON, supra note 5, at 181 (discussing the im-
pact of Apodaca and Johnson). The Court's decisions have not opened the
floodgates; Louisiana and Oregon remain the only states authorizing felony con-
victions by less than a unanimous verdict. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 181. Los
Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti, however, made favorable comments about
nonunanimous verdicts after the hung jury in the Menendez case, and in the
wake of the Simpson trial, petitions are circulating for a California ballot mea-
sure that would allow nonunannimous verdicts in most criminal cases. See Laura
Mansnerns, supra note 3, at A7; Josh Meyer, Non-Unanimous Jury Idea Appeals
to Some Reformers, LA. Tiars, Sept. 28, 1994, at A12.
114. ABRAmSON, supra note 5, at 13.
115. Id. at 241.
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nullification, insisting on unanimity, and reversing the trend toward
disqualifying jurors for mere exposure to publicity.116 Unlike Stephen
Adler, Abramson starts from the premise that "jurors are smarter
than assumed by lawyers working from manuals."117 At times, the
distinction between deliberative and representative seems to be a se-
mantic one, but Abramson maintains that only a deliberative process
can preserve legitimacy. In high profile cases that capture the public's
attention and draw its censure, juries are labeled as primarily repre-
sentative. The evidence of the jury's ability to deliberate and reach
sensible and unanimous verdicts in "everyday" cases may prove Ab-
ramson's theory that the jury can join justice and democracy. Abram-
son does not fully explore how to put that theory into practice, but We,
The Jury is an eloquent historical defense of the jury's place within
our democratic system.
III. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES
"No matter how uplifting, energizing, and empowering the concept, what was
the good of a system that produced the shoddy-and sometimes patently stu-
pid-verdicts that frequently resulted?"1 18
Stephen Adler expresses the criticisms of the jury that Abramson
avoids in his idealistic account, and he turns high profile cases into
parables about the flaws of the system. The Jury: Trial and Error in
the American Courtroom reflects Adler's background as a journalist,
and it contrasts with Abramson's theoretical, contextual account of
the institution. Adler reconstructs deliberations from the memories of
jurors, and he interviews the players involved in selecting and per-
suading the jury in six different trials. Adler's book begins as though
it were a continuation of Abramson's: "We celebrate the jurors' demo-
cratic power but no longer trust the decisions they reach."11 9 He of-
fers a glimpse of a system in which "lots of sincere, serious people-for
a variety of reasons-were missing key points, focusing on irrelevant
issues, succumbing to barely recognized prejudices, failing to see
through the cheapest appeals to sympathy or hate, and generally
botching the job."120 Despite this description, and his disagreement
with the substantive outcomes of the cases he describes, Adler ulti-
mately reveals his own attachment to the ideal of a democratic resolu-
tion to trials.
Adler separates accurate dispute resolution from the ideal of jus-
tice and finds himself "delighting in the spectacle of entrusting
116. See id. at 247-48. He also mentions eliminating statutory exemptions from jury
service to spread the obligation and multiply the diversity.
117. Id. at 5.
118. ADLER, supra note 4, at xv.
119. Id. at xiii.
120. Id. at xiv.
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whatever was at issue to a random slice of the community, rather than
a single judge."121 Where Abramson praises and resurrects the demo-
cratic foundations of the jury and only hints at his doubts about its
validity, Adler pushes his criticisms to the foreground and only occa-
sionally lets his admiration show through. He begins his book by ex-
pressing his delight in the jury "minutemen aiming their muskets
over stone walls," but he then criticizes the "shoddy-and sometimes
patently stupid-verdicts that frequently resulted."122 The jury por-
trayed through Adler's investigative reporting inspires little confi-
dence in the system. But even though he points out that the
experiences of other countries suggest that a jury system is not a pre-
condition of "a well-ordered society or even a representative democ-
racy," Adler concludes that we should preserve the American jury. 23
Adler asks throughout his book how the democratic ideal Abram-
son describes can survive in the face of human error, complex trials,
and procedural inefficiency. While jury verdicts are often the climax
of both real dramas and fictional television and movie representations
of the system, jury deliberations generally take place "off camera."124
In The Jury, Adler sharpens the focus on those deliberations and
reveals serious flaws. "If mystery is all that jury verdicts have going
for them," he states, "the jury system is surely in deep trouble."125
Each chapter of The Jury serves as another parable about the pitfalls
of the jury system, and Adler insists that the problems are pervasive.
In each parable, however, one can read between the lines to find juries
acting exactly as they should.
The structure of the book reflects Adler's conflicted premise. He
opens with a "Vision" of a jury operating fairly and effectively, and
closes with the "Hope" that the jury can and will survive, but the sec-
tion entitled "Disappointment" overwhelms the framing sections. Ad-
ler describes five juries who failed in ways that he claims are "more
representative than anomalous."126 The Jury begins where Abramson
leaves off in his book, with an examination of a jury deciding whether
or not to inflict the death penalty. Abramson used the imbalanced im-
position of the death penalty as an example of some of the failings of
the jury system, but Adler first describes a jury debating seriously and
competently about it. He prizes the deliberations of this model jury
because they demonstrate "the little guy speaking for all of us, justice
121. Id.
122. Id. at xiv-xv.
123. Id. at xv. I focus my analysis in this essay on the criminal jury system, but Ad-
ler's insights into both criminal and civil juries inform the basic question about
its competence and public perceptions of its legitimacy.
124. The notable exception, of course, is Twelve Angry Men.
125. ADLEn, supra note 4, at 206.
126. Id. at xvi.
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handed up from the community, not down from some gilded hilltop
legislature."12 7
According to the description in the "Vision," Adler values evidence-
driven deliberation, careful consideration of each element, even when
the verdict looks like a foregone conclusion, and the jurors' sense of
the gravity of the decision to impose death. Death penalty cases call
for a community decision on whether to forgive or exact retribution.
Because of the wide discretion afforded jurors, their interaction often
becomes the deciding element. Adler admires the different exper-
iences "citizen soldiers"128 bring to the deliberations without mention-
ing demographic diversity. He sounds a similar note to Abramson's
when he states that "our most exalted vision of the jury room is a place
where members of a group, by challenging one another's ideas, values,
and loyalties, can achieve a coherent result."12 9 Although Adler
praises this first jury, he credits straightforward facts, clear legal is-
sues, a case of manageable length, and equally matched lawyers for
their model deliberations.130 The five cases that follow do not benefit
from such a balanced courtroom, and Adler finds glaring flaws in the
jury's performance.
In the first chapter of "The Disappointment" section, "Lawyer's
Poker," Adler addresses the problem of jury selection through the mis-
information and manipulation that led to the "not guilty" verdicts in
the Marcos case. Perhaps the most remarkable story Adler tells in the
book depicts a party Imelda Marcos threw for the jurors after her ac-
quittal on racketeering, conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and mail
fraud charges. The description of the party humorously but sharply
mocks the jury's capacity to judge a defendant according to community
values: They could not see Imelda Marcos as a peer. Adler describes
the jurors emerging from the New York subway and their "steaming
hot apartments in less elegant quarters of the city"131 into an evening
of belly dancing, roast pig, autographed photographs of Marcos, and
front row seats in her penthouse apartment to hear her sing "God
Bless America," the Philippine national anthem, and "Feelings." The
entire Marcos case exemplifies the burden on a jury system charged
with representing a disparate citizenry in increasingly complex cases.
The jurors simply did not see Marcos' actions as harmful to their
community.
127. Id. at 3. Note that Adler also cites the familiar folklore of the jury's noble mo-
ments: John Peter Zenger's trial, Twelve Angry Men, and Alexis de Tocqueville's
praise of the American jury. Id. at 4, 9.
128. Id. at 39.
129. Id. at 27.
130. See id. at 40.
131. Id. at 49.
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But the party, as unseemly as it sounds, does not pose the problem
Adler identifies in the Marcos case. He uses the acquittal as an illus-
tration of the jury's susceptibility to emotional appeals, and its inabil-
ity to deal with complexity or set aside personal prejudices. Adler
attributes the "mutual delusion" that occurred on the jury to the law-
yer's skill at steering the least capable people onto the jury and then
manipulating them to his advantage. 32 He aims his attack in this
section at peremptory challenges. The weakest cases, he argues, in-
spire lawyers to seek easily confused jurors.1S3 The Marcos jurors
uniformly were "ill informed about public affairs and uninterested in
the topic."13 4 The defense lawyer managed to seat a juror who had
never bought a newspaper and did not know before voir dire whether
Imelda Marcos was a man or a woman, as well as jurors who had
never heard of Marcos' co-defendant Adnan Khashoggi. The defense
then painted a convincing portrait of Marcos as subservient to her
husband, distanced from both his politics and his finances,1 35 and as a
victim of the once friendly United States government that was prose-
cuting the case.1 36 Adler calls the tactic "history boldly rewritten to
benefit jurors who were not privy to any other version."1 37 Despite
overwhelming evidence, the prosecution could not convince the jury to
follow a trail of money leading back to Marcos.13 s The complexity of
the financial transactions combined with the emotional appeal of
Marcos' dramatic courtroom sobbing and fainting led many jurors to
doubt the prosecution's case. They began to believe that she had been
treated unfairly, and the prosecution never offered a satisfactory an-
swer to their confusion about why she was tried in the United
States.13 9
But was the verdict really all that indefensible? The jurors
reached a mutual decision to acquit because they saw no reason to
punish Marcos and because they did not understand the United
States' interest in the case. 140 Adler's objections to the acquittal do
not necessarily indict the jury system; the prosecutors simply failed to
132. See id. at 50.
133. Id. at 53.
134. Id. at 59.
135. Id. at 65.
136. Id. at 67.
137. Id. at 65.
138. One juror commented on the complicated charts detailing financial transactions:
"The lawyers were in their own little thing .... They should have stopped and
explained it to us, right?" Id. at 69.
139. Id. at 71. A juror explained: "She didn't seem like a person who would scheme
and cheat people.... I thought, 'Why are they harassing this sick woman?' Id.
140. See id. at 79. Another juror summed up the deliberations: "What do we want
from her? She lost her husband, she lost her country, she lost her place. And for
a woman like that, that's punishment. Why do we want to put the last nail in the
coffin?" Id. at 81.
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prove their case. Adler acknowledges the outgunned prosecutors, the
complicated case, and the difficult instructions, but he does not locate
the problem there. He insists that only the informed and articulate
individuals who systematically were removed from the jury pool could
have processed the information. His criticisms of excessive excuses
and peremptory challenges differ from Abramson's because he focuses
not on the advantage of diverse perspectives but on the disadvantage
of ill-informed jurors: "The hope-that in America no one is too hum-
ble to judge, no one too exalted to be judged-had given way to the
disappointment of a verdict driven by ignorance and misplaced sym-
pathy."141 Yet Adler also hints at his delight in the twelve people,
awed by Marcos' apartment at the post-verdict party, wielding the
power to decide her fate. Ultimately, the danger of seduction by an
emotional or attractive defendantL42 seems a small price to pay for the
legitimacy of community consensus in criminal cases.
Adler uses a murder trial to criticize the jury's ability to recall facts
accurately in "Love and Death in New Jersey." Although a love-trian-
gle scenario in which questions of credibility become crucial should
present an opportunity for the jury to excel, Adler identifies "lapses,
oversights, and unsupported assumptions" in the deliberations that
call into question the validity of the "not guilty" verdict. The jurors
reach a decision Adler attributes to the relative attractiveness of the
two defendants. The deliberations he describes conjure up a popular
image of the jury as "a dozen brain-deads telling each other that the
defendant seems like a nice, quiet young man, then laughing at the
prosecutor's tie."143 But even though they were susceptible to appear-
ances in reaching their verdict, the jurors did precisely what jurors
are supposed to do. They assessed the witnesses' credibility and
brought to the deliberations their own experiences and particularized
knowledge of guns, blue collar social mores, and romance. 144 The re-
sult seems incorrect in part because scattered witness accounts gave
the jury insufficient information to reconstruct the events. The errors
here might also have occurred if a judge had made the decision.145
141. Id. at 82.
142. Most research indicates that the jurors are not particularly good at telling when
someone is lying. Jurors overwhelmingly believe that an appealing witness is
more likely to be honest. See id. at 177-78.
143. Harris, supra note 17, at 785 (quoting DAVI SIMON, HOMICIDE 457 (1990)).
144. See ADLER, supra note 4, at 202-04.
145. Many of the flaws attributed to the jury would be no less prevalent in the only
reasonable alternative to the system: civil law judges. Judges are not immune
from the human errors that arise on the jury. A New York Criminal Court judge
has even been accused of judicial misconduct for deciding the length of a defend-
ant's sentence with a coin toss. See Judge Facing Charges in Coin-Flipping Case,
N.Y. TIrMs, Jan. 20, 1983, at B3 (The Legal Aid Society defense attorney ex-
plained "Judge Freis asked me, 'Is your client a gambling man?').
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Adler's argument takes a different turn in the civil trials in which
he identifies more significant faults in the jury verdicts. In these
cases, problems do arise from the jury's lack of expertise. Again, how-
ever, the glimpse Adler offers of the jury suggests both merits and
flaws. He focuses on the potential for scientific jury selection to deter-
mine the outcome of a tort case in a chapter entitled "The Wizard of
Odds." The chapter describes a farfetched liability case against Pizza
Hut brought on behalf of a teenage boy run over by a woman who had
allegedly been drinking at the restaurant. With no witnesses to place
the woman either drinking in or even present at Pizza Hut .that day,
the case looked unwinnable. But the plaintiffs lawyers dipped into
the defendant's deep pockets with the help of a scientific jury
consultant.
Adler lends more credence to a jury expert's ability to determine
the outcome of cases than Abramson does. He also credits selection
experts with a quiet but dramatic affect on the declining faith in the
jury system.146 The young boy's lawyers shaped their argument with
the help of jury consultants and a mock jury, and they began to instill
a plausible scenario for Pizza Hut's liability in potential jurors during
voir dire. If the lawyers had presented their original argument to a
truly random jury, Adler claims, they could not have achieved a
favorable verdict. Disappointment with shadow juries and pretrial
polling reflects the community's interest in addressing disputes on a
level playing field.147 The affront of scientific jury selection may be
that it forces the community to show its cards ahead of the game.
Although both authors agree on the danger scientific selection poses to
the legitimacy of the jury, Abramson differs in his insistence that jury
selection does not determine the outcome of the case, and that jurors
generally rise above demographics to consider the evidence.
The Pizza Hut parable reads more like a story of clever plaintiffs
lawyers than an indictment of the jury system. Adler probably sneers
more at the adversarial system and aggressive and creative lawyering
than at the jury itself. The two sides in the case are evenly matched
and the result of the case is not a particularly outlandish settle-
ment.' 48 Adler himself asks the question: "[W]hat's wrong with
strengthening the weapons at the adversaries' disposal?"'149 His an-
swer lies in the importance of the perception that the jury reaches a
146. See ADLER, supra note 4, at 86.
147. Adler resents the technique of selling the jury on a particular version of the case
during voir dire. He critically points out Donald Vinson's advice that "jurors
must not be aware that an attempt is being made to persuade them." Id. at 105.
148. The plaintiff eventually recovered $450,000. Id. at 112. Moreover, one of the
plaintiffs jury profiles even recommends people with "high social integration" be-
cause they are most likely to hold Pizza Hut to high standards in its training of
employees. Id. at 103.
149. Id. at 113.
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legitimate verdict. When the rights or interests of the individual ap-
pear to totally trump the community's input into resolving the case,
criticism of the jury sharpens. The jury loses its moral authority when
jurors serve only as pawns in a game between adversaries.150 Strate-
gic exclusions render juries less representative of their communities
according to Adler's analysis.151
"What's a Blivet?" fully develops Adler's objections based on the
jury's inability to cope with complexity. In the best of his parables,
Adler begins the chapter on the impossible complexity of an antitrust
case by juxtaposing a typical day in the life of the jury foreman
against the life of the lawyer who ultimately wins the case. He frames
the chapter with their stories to point out that the jury was out-
matched from the beginning.152 But the contrast between the law-
yer's elaborate preparations for the case and the jury foreman's
morning of bass fishing also highlights the empowerment possible
through jury service. The "big city" lawyer cannot win, whatever legal
arsenal he assembles, unless a furniture manufacturer and part time
fisherman finds his case credible. The lawyer prepares for five years
and pioneers a novel antitrust theory under the Robinson-Patman
Act, and the jury foreman responds to a summons in order to avoid his
hot apartment by escaping to the Greensboro federal court for the
summer.
The trial Adler describes transforms the federal courtroom into a
"theatre of the absurd,"153 and in this chapter he makes his strongest
argument that the jury has outlived its usefulness. However, taken
together with the jurors' confusion in the Marcos case, the delibera-
tions here suggest not that the jury no longer serves a purpose, but
that some proposed reforms to the jury system are necessary. 154 Ad-
ler explains the complex issue in Liggett & Myers v. Brown & William-
son at the beginning of the chapter in layman's terms, and the lawyers
in these cases should have done the same thing for the jury. Not one
150. See id. ("Why should we defer to the decision of a group of individuals who have
been selected for their likely partisanship and then persuaded by many of the
same techniques that sell soap and breakfast cereal? When verdicts come to
seem more manipulated than majestic, one thinks of Brave New World rather
than Twelve Angry Men.")(emphasis added).
151. See id. at 114. Another problem he sees with scientific jury selection is the disad-
vantage to those who cannot afford it, and his story here would have been more
alarming had it included mismatched parties. "The affluent people and the cor-
porations can buy it, the poor radicals get it free, and everyone in between is at a
disadvantage." Id. (citing a personal interview with sociologist Amitai Etzioni).
Adler's anger at jury experts leads him to propose the elimination of peremptory
challenges, "which would have a Kryptonite-like effect on these new supermen of
the legal world." Id. at 114-15.
152. See id. at 116-17.
153. Id. at 118.
154. See infra Part V on "Future Reforms."
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of the jurors on the case had proceeded beyond high school or regu-
larly read a newspaper: "Many people have recurrent nightmares in
which they are hunched over a final exam in a subject they've never
taken or a language they've never seen. For the Greensboro jurors,
the test booklets were about to be handed out."155 Fiercely bored and
entirely mystified, the jurors decided the case in part on their assess-
ments of the personalities and demeanor of the attorneys and expert
witnesses.1 56
To a great extent, however, the jury divided into two camps dic-
tated by their "ethical compasses."'57 The jurors debated about
whether the companies competed fairly, and reached a conclusion in
favor of Liggett that the appeals court overturned. But the position
the appeals court eventually took actually had been discussed during
the deliberations. The jury foreman, whom Adler described fishing at
the beginning of the chapter, advocated the "correct" result, but finally
gave in to the other jurors. At least one juror, therefore, instinctively
understood the heart of the issue despite the complicated legal maneu-
vers of both sides. If the judge and the attorneys had posed the ques-
tions in clearer terms, the deliberations might have been entirely
defensible.
After the trial, the jurors expressed increased curiosity, but also
misgivings, about the justice system. The foreman took great pride in
having served as a juror, but he concluded that "I don't believe you can
leave justice to people who don't know laws and business manage-
ment."15s Although Adler describes the Liggett trial as a waste of tax-
payers' and jurors' resources, the story suggests that intelligent
management of the trial and comprehensible instructions could pro-
duce a legitimate verdict even in a case of this complexity. Many of
the jurors displayed savvy instincts, but did not have the tools to turn
them into a verdict. Adler grudgingly suggests support for the jury
system even in the light of this failure when he observes that cases
involving huge sums of corporate money are "political" cases in which
the community should participate.1 -9
Adler offers another parable about the caprice and emotion that
drive juries in his account of a case concerning liability for a transfu-
sion of AIDS-tainted blood. The Quintana case, described in "Blood
Money," illustrates how a jury awards damages when an individual
takes on a large corporation. Adler focuses on the damages to high-
155. ADLE , supra note 4, at 124.
156. See id. at 127. The scattered quality of the deliberations here also suggests an
argument for giving instructions ahead of time and for clarifying them through-
out the trial. See id. at 130.
157. Id. at 133-34.
158. Id. at 142. Another juror asked the author: "Is the Supreme Court made up of
judges or of jurors like me?" Id.
159. See id. at 144.
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light that emotional appeals sometimes transcend a juror's rational
decisionmaking functions. Critics of the civil jury see them as "angry
avengers of the powerless rather than as sober arbiters of dis-
putes."160 Adler admits that while extraordinary damage awards
often get the most press attention, the median award is actually a rea-
sonable figure. But, he sees the "blood money" awarded to the
Quintana family in this case as an example of a jury's disappointing
performance. The specter of a dying AIDS patient in the courtroom
haunted the jurors into overcompensating her, despite evidence that
the blood bank acted prudently given what they knew at the time of
the transfusion. The jury also awarded damages based in part on the
size of the corporation rather than the estimated extent of the dam-
ages. 16 ' In a scene that would chill any corporate defense lawyer, the
jury made ad hoc calculations, multiplied their figures to account for
attorneys' fees, and arrived at a sum of 8.15 million dollars. Like
many of Adler's parables, the Quintana case falls short of the wither-
ing critique he intends. The jury made a serious and concerted effort
to calculate the Quintanas' loss, and if the verdict appears extraordi-
nary, the error stems from inadequate instructions and lack of gui-
dance, not from any inherent flaw in the jury system. Moreover, the
amount of the verdict can be seen as a reflection of the depth of the
community's concern about AIDS.162
Adler arrives at the same point as Abramson through an entirely
different route. After a critical look behind the jury room door, he con-
cludes that "[e]ven in the cases in which the juries we observed per-
formed woefully, it seemed clear that there were powerful reasons to
want a jury to make the decision."' 63 Like Abramson, he bases his
final defense of the jury on its democratizing function and on the ac-
commodations that juries make between individuals and communi-
ties. Each critical parable contains an affirmation of the jury or hints
that the jurors should not bear the blame for their errors. Adler finds
dispiriting the trend toward "making jurors less harmful by limiting
their power to do wrong rather than making them more useful and
effective by giving them the tools to do right."164 And he ends his book
with concrete suggestions for giving them those tools. He proposes re-
forms to make the jury more competent, fairminded, and delibera-
160. Id. at 146.
161. Id. at 163.
162. See id. at 173 ("[Clommunity values... had been brought to bear on the out-
come."). On the other hand, medical malpractice awards are declining as the
community hears the corporate outcry about their crippling effect.
163. Id. at 215.
164. Id. at 270.
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tive.' 65 Although his book focuses on "disappointment" in the jury,
Adler stresses that many of the shortcomings represent the imperfec-
tions of human nature or institutional failings in the courtroom, and
not fundamental flaws in the jury system.
IV. DEMOCRATIC POWER
Both Adler and Abramson end their analysis of the jury before
fully exploring its role as a policymaker. The jury serves not only to
protect the body politic from offenders but also to articulate the poli-
cies that frame the criminal justice system. Every trial includes a sec-
ondary drama: "the ceremonial enactment of the law itself and the
affirmation of the principles, good or bad, by which society is or-
dered."166 Abramson writes that "only the jury still regularly calls
upon ordinary citizens to engage each other in a face-to-face process of
debate"; jurors perform an exercise in self government even more par-
ticipatory than the act of voting.1 67
Although the jury no longer has the right to directly determine
questions of law in forty-eight states,1 68 it still plays an important role
in policy development. De Tocqueville wrote in 1835 that the jury was
a preeminently political institution and "one form of the sovereignty of
the people."169 Thomas Jefferson stated that, if called upon to decide
whether to omit the people from the legislative or the judiciary, "I
would say it is better to leave them out of the legislative. The execu-
165. See id. at 226 (explaining that jurors require the "perquisites of power," "reason-
able creature comforts, practical training in the nature of their endeavor, and
easier access to information about the particulars of the cases before them").
166. Friedman, supra note 16, at 1594 (quoting Carl Smith, American Law and the
Literary Mind, in LAw AND ADw cAN LrrERAT=ra: A COLLECTION OF EssAys, 1,
12 (1980)).
167. AnRAmSON, supra note 5, at 8. One tension within the policymaking role for the
jury, stressed in Adler's book, is that the citizens who "vote" on the jury are se-
lected for their indifference and inattention to the issues. One possible interpre-
tation of the jury's indifference is that it charts a determined middle ground, even
on inflammatory issues, and therefore jury policymaking reflects genuine commu-
nity consensus. See also Gobert, supra note 60, at 288 (explaining that "voting is
done in anonymity... [but] while the deliberations of jurors are secret to the
outside world, jurors must frequently defend their positions to each other").
168. Indiana and Maryland are the exceptions. After Sparf & Hansen v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), the jury no longer had the legal right to decide the law
in federal courts.
169. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVHLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERiCA (1835) ("The jury is, above all, a
political institution, and it must be regarded in this light in order to be duly ap-
preciated."). See also ADLza, supra note 4, at 5 ("The jury is a sort of ad hoc
parliament convened from the citizenry at large to lend respectability and au-
thority to the process .... Any erosion of citizen participation in the sanctioning
system is in the long run likely... to result in a reduction in the moral authority
that supports the process.")(quoting Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Liti-
gation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3rd Cir. 1980)(Gibbons, J., dissenting)).
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tion of the laws is more important than the making of them."'170 The
jury actually has a hand in both activities; it can either prevent the
government from acting or allow it to proceed with punishment,171
and it also influences the laws defining that punishment. The specter
of a jury trial affects the inner workings of the justice system includ-
ing settlements and plea bargains, 172 and its impact extends beyond
the courtroom to the legislature. Either through unwillingness to im-
plement unjust laws or through strict application of unpopular laws,
juries have taken the opportunity to change the rules themselves.
Jury nullification allows citizens to inject their beliefs about the
kind of community they want to create into the judicial process. 173 It
occurs when the law is so at odds with the community's opinion that
even an "impartial" jury feels compelled to protest an injustice. The
Zenger trial, establishing the press' right to print criticism of the gov-
ernment, may be the first example of the jury as policymakers. 174 Al-
exander Hamilton's argument in Zenger's defense focused on the law
of the future rather than the existing law, and he urged the jurors to
recognize the right of citizens to criticize their rulers.175 Northern ju-
ries continued that tradition by acquitting those arrested and charged
with aiding fugitive slaves.176 Jury nullification also eventually
170. See ABRAmSON, supra note 5, at 30 (quoting Letter of Jefferson to the Abbe
Arnoux, in THE PAPERS OF THomAs JEFFERSON 283 (Julian P. Boyd, ed., 1958)).
171. Adler comments that as a result of John Peter Zenger's trial, "both the king's men
and the colonists understood thereafter that juries could put severe limits on any
ruler's use of power." ADLER, supra note 4, at 5.
172. See LvnE, supra note 5, at 171 (stating that how a case is resolved at the pre-
trial stage is governed by expectations about what would happen if the case went
to a jury).
173. The Supreme Court has recognized the jury's power as the conscience of the com-
munity. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952), the Court stated
that "juries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges." See also
Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 102, at 75 (discussing the Court's recognition of
the importance of common sense interpretation of technical laws in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
174. See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 75; Creagan, supra note 104, at 1109-10 (discuss-
ing the impact of the Zenger trial on the early American jury: "[I]n colonial
America, the jury was a shield between the people and an undemocratic, tyranni-
cal government. The jury provided the only significant means of democratic ex-
pression available to the people at this time."). See also Rene Lynch, Reformers
Want to Give Jurors a Freer Hand, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1993, at B1 (Orange
County ed.) (calling nullification a "blow for liberty in a time of tyranny") (quoting
William C. Thompson, Associate Professor of Criminology, Law, and Society at
U.C. Irvine).
175. See HANs & VmmAR, supra note 12, at 34 (describing Hamilton's presentation to
the jury on the kind of statement that should constitute libel and the right of
citizens to criticize their rulers).
176. See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 80-82 (stating that Northern defense lawyers put
the Fugitive Slave law itself on trial).
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ended the Salem witch trials and effected the repeal of Prohibition. 177
One recent example of jury nullification is the acquittal of an African
American defendant in Washington, D.C. based on the jury's convic-
tions about racial disparities in incarceration rates and the belief that
those disparities reflect racism in the administration of justice.1 78
Particularly for underrepresented groups, jury nullification is an op-
portunity for oversight in a system dominated by police, prosecutorial,
and judicial discretion. Nullification, when it signals a gap between
community beliefs or priorities and the law, embodies the democratic
potential of the jury. In "political trials," when the government serves
as both prosecutor and victim, the opening for democratic participa-
tion is especially important.179
Juries bring the community's views on the state of the law into the
courtroom. In the civil context, several recent articles document a de-
cline in damage awards, attributable to both the perception that they
cripple business and widespread anti-regulatory sentiment.3 0 On the
criminal side, juries mirror evolving understanding of domestic vio-
lence and acquaintance rape.3S1 The Goetz trial also provides a dra-
177. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 102, at 71 (explaining that because of the
high acquittal rate in prohibition cases during the 1920s and early 1930s, prohi-
bition laws could not be enforced and the laws eventually were repealed).
178. See Randall Kennedy, Changing Images of the State: The State, Criminal Law,
and Racial Discrimination, 107 HARv. L. RFv. 1255, 1260 n.21 (1994) (reporting
that some jurors have refused to vote to convict African American defendants
even though they believed they were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because
they have heard claims that racial disparities in incarceration rates reflect ra-
cism in the criminal justice system). See also Barton Gellman & Shari Horwitz,
Letter Stirs Debate AfterAcquittal, WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 1990 at Al (describing a
letter received by a court official from a juror asserting that the jury acquiesced to
the foreman who "didn't want to send anymore young black men to jail, even if he
did kill that young man over drugs"); Minow & Cate, supra note 35, at 661 (con-
firming the story) (citing Klaidman, Racial Politics in the Jury Room, LEGAL
Tims, Apr. 23, 1990, at 1). The instinct to rein in the government may also have
influenced the surprising acquittal in the DeLorean case. One juror explained:
We weren't trying to make policy or send messages, but there is a
message here.... It's that our citizens will not let our government go too
far... In this country, the government can only go so far and then its
citizens will draw them back in line. And that's what we did - in this
case only... We were not making any kind of statement about what the
government does generally. We were simply telling the government that
it went too far on this one. You see we just did our job as jurors, which is
one hell of a responsibility.
Hans & Vidmar, supra note 12, at 18.
179. Scheflin, supra note 102, at 191.
180. See, e.g., Richard Pdrez-Pefla, Study Finds Sharp Drop Last Year in Awards for
Medical Malpractice Cases, N.Y. Tirs, Jan. 27, 1995, at B22 (attributing a sharp
decline in jury awards in malpractice cases to the "national dialogue on tort re-
form and soaring health care costs").
181. See, e.g., L.vmE, supra note 5, at 111 (reporting a steady increase in rape convic-
tions since the 1960s and attributing it, at least in part, to "increased public sup-
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matic example of a jury decision reflecting public fears and
frustrations about crime.' 8 2 In another variation on its policymaking
role, the jury's acceptance of the insanity defense for John Hinckley
directly led to a reformulation of the defense.
The argument in the North trial that the government, as the peo-
ple's representative, benefits from engaged jurors further supports the
idea that the jury system serves an underlying policymaking function.
The prosecution asserted that "we want [jurors] informed so they will
be good citizens. Good citizens make good jurors, whether it is for the
government or for the defense. And to preclude good citizens from
serving on the jury because they are informed really goes against all of
the constitutional bases of free trial, free press, the right to a jury trial
and good government."1ss The conflation of language about constitu-
tional rights, good government, and civic duties like voting lends sup-
port to the idea that jury service provides an opportunity for
participatory democracy.
Many critics, on the other hand, accuse the jury of acting as a
pseudodemocracy that circumvents the laws of a democratically
elected legislature and thereby undermines the rule of law.' 8 4 Judge
Jerome Frank wrote that the jury is "the worst possible enemy of [the]
ideal of the 'supremacy of law'."185 "Jury-made law," according to
Judge Frank, yields "the maximum in the way of lack of uniform-
ity."1 86 The perceived value of the jury as a lawmaker depends in
large part on the beholder's view of the institution. Those who decry a
lawmaking jury as the rule of individuals rather than laws view the
jury as an unwarranted intrusion into the political process. But if the
rule of law only exists with the consent of the governed and with con-
tinuous input from the community, then the jury's intervention into
critical issues in the justice system is essential.
The jury's policymaking role actually ensures that principles of le-
gality endure. Perceptions of the legitimacy and accuracy of jury ver-
dicts track the communication between legal and popular culture,
communication to which legislators are increasingly attuned. Jury
verdicts inform lawmakers about the "harmony, or lack thereof, be-
tween the laws and the people. This information, when fed back to the
port for women's rights in the contemporary era that carries over into the jury
room").
182. See id. at 4 (-The case was played out against a backdrop of seemingly rampant
crime... the nationwide conservatism spurred by high crime rates was surely a
key political element in the jury's handling of the Goetz case.").
183. Panel Two, supra note 56, at 596. See also Vikram D. Amar, Jury Service as
Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CoRN.LL L. REv. 203 (1995).
184. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 4.
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legal system and to the community, can serve to bring the law and its
administration in line with popular sentiment."1s 7 Because the jury
provides a direct mechanism for incorporating the views of the popula-
tion, it keeps the justice system from stagnating,18 s and it serves rule
of law values by giving the people a stake in the system. Even Adler
reports that the jurors he interviewed were proud of having served
and came away from the experience with a more favorable view of the
system: "More than when they vote, or pay taxes, or attend a parade,
they are realizing the democratic vision that still sustains our nation.
They are governing themselves."189
V. FUTURE REFORMS
Abramson and Adler disagree descriptively on the competence of
the jury and normatively on the theoretical foundations that support
it, but neither proposes abandoning it altogether. Both argue that in-
cremental reform can correct many of its internal flaws, salvage its
reputation, and respond to the external pressure of public frustration.
The jury currently carries the blame for failings of the system that
have nothing to do with the competence of jurors. Some proposed re-
forms might shift that misplaced frustration away from the jury.190
The most important predictor of legitimacy is the perceived fairness of
the jury.'91 Procedural reforms, from the beginning of the selection
process to the end of deliberations, can improve the appearance of fair-
ness if they empower rather than cripple the jury.' 92 Most commenta-
tors conclude that a carefully selected jury given accurate instructions
and presented with coherent evidence will be superior to a judge be-
cause of jurors' collective comprehension and independent, earnest ap-
187. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 102, at 69.
188. Interview with Judge William Huss, supra note 5 (expressing the opinion that, in
the civil system, functionaries get jaded too early in their careers). See also AB-
RAAisON, supra note 5, at 5 ("[T]he jury, far from being obsolete, is more crucial
than ever in a multiethnic society struggling to articulate a justice common to
U.S. citizens.").
189. ADLER, supra note 4, at 242.
190. See Panel Two, supra note 56, at 593 ('[Ilt is really unfair to blame jurors...
when you have rules of evidence that are so antiquated that they make it almost
impossible for a jury to understand what is going on.")(quoting Judge Stanley
Sporkin).
191. Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizen's Perceptions of the
Criminal Jury, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 333,349 (1988)(discussing the results of a
study showing that "[c]itizen evaluations of [the jury] are based on issues beyond
the questions of competence ... In particular, citizens are concerned with issues
of fair procedure").
192. See Judge B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights": Creating
Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1230 (1993)(arguing that
dysfunctions stem from the system's insistence on passive jurors).
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proach to the proceedings.193 Procedural obstacles, however, often
prevent careful selection, coherence, and clarity in the courtroom.
Both Adler and Abramson suggest reforms to ensure these precondi-
tions for fairness.
A. Peremptory Challenges
The debate about the survival of the peremptory challenge once
again implicates the difference between advantages to the individual
defendant and responsibility to the community. Both Adler and Ab-
ramson argue that abolishing the peremptory challenge would en-
hance the legitimacy of jury verdicts. For Abramson, peremptories
are the most difficult thing to reconcile with the cross-sectional, delib-
erative ideal. He identifies a tension between a theory of impartiality
that supports defendants eliminating jurors who might be biased
against them and the theory that biases should be represented on the
jury to counterweigh other group prejudices.194 Restrictions on per-
emptories evolved as our concept of democracy grew more inclusive, 1 95
and the next logical step after Batson is for the Court to eliminate any
peremptory challenges that target specific groups. 196 Abramson asks
why the Court should permit any peremptory challenges exercised on
the basis of "generalizations about the influence of religion, national
origin, or occupation on jurors?"197 Abolishing peremptory challenges
might ensure that juries consist of fair cross sections of the commu-
nity, and it would minimize the gamesmanship that has undermined
the legitimacy of recent controversial verdicts.
Adler also argues persuasively that eliminating peremptory chal-
lenges would "mean that decades of stereotypes about how people of
various ethnic groups are likely to vote would become moot."198 The
strongest argument against peremptories is that they allow covert ra-
193. See, e.g., Prentice H. Marshall, A View from the Bench: Practical Perspectives on
Juries, 1990 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 147, 147.
194. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 132.
195. See Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury
Service, 61 U. CN. L. REV. 1139, 1156 (1993) (stating that Batson and its progeny
endeavor to "reclaim the jurybox as the microcosm of representative democracy").
196. In Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987), the Court concluded that perempto-
ries are not guaranteed by the Constitution, so their use could be significantly
abridged. Ideally, the defendant would then achieve an impartial jury through
the use of"for cause" challenges. In many jurisdictions, however, judges conduct
voir dire and do not probe deeply enough to reveal biases.
197. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 137.
198. ADLER, supra note 4, at 224. He also argues that in addition to eliminating per-
emptories, judges should constrict exemptions and enforce the requirement of
jury service: "The same people who ridicule the acquittal of Imelda Marcos or the
hung juries of the Menendez brothers should by rights embrace a jury system in
which everyone is required to show up for jury duty periodically and in which
jury evasion is taken seriously." Id. at 221.
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cial discrimination into the process of selecting a jury.199 There is no
question that peremptories sometimes have depended on crude racial
stereotypes. A 1973 Dallas County prosecutor's manual advised the
elimination of "any member of a minority group" because prosecutors
are "not looking for a fair juror, but rather a strong, biased, and some-
times hypocritical individual who believes that Defendants are differ-
ent from them in kind, rather than degree."20 0 Although Batson
prevents the explicit use of peremptory challenges against racial mi-
norities, attorneys often strike jurors for attitude, posture, appear-
ance, and even more intangible factors.201
The defense of peremptories focuses on their place within the ad-
versary system. Barbara Babcock points out that the Supreme Court
jurisprudence on peremptories has praised them as "well-designed to
ensure both that juries are impartial and that they appear so to the
litigants and to society at large."20 2 Entrusting jury selection to the
judge alone through the challenge for cause would eliminate an impor-
tant check within our trial system. Peremptories serve as a necessary
safety valve because many judges impose strict standards for chal-
lenges for cause.20 3 Peremptories also limit the power of either side to
stack the jury, and trial lawyers' instincts about jurors often guide
them into a compromise jury that suits both sides.204 Many judges
maintain that the peremptory may be the only method to strike a ju-
ror who seems irrational and likely to produce a hung jury.20 5 They
also grant the litigant some measure of choice over the jury and there-
fore some level of comfort with the result of the deliberative pro-
199. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 121 (1986)(Burger, C.J., dissenting)(calling
peremptory challenges "a system that allows the covert expression of what we
dare not say but know is true more often than not"); id. at 106 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (arguing for the elimination of peremptory challenges because of the
potential for continuing racial discrimination: "Even if all parties approach the
Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires
them to confront and overcome their own racism on all levels-a challenge I
doubt all of them can meet.").
200. Rosen, supra note 85, at 15.
201. Id. (pointing out that in a recent Alabama trial, the prosecutor was permitted to
strike six of the seven African Americans on the jury for racially neutral reasons
like an "unkempt and gruff' appearance).
202. Babcock, supra note 195, at 1175.
203. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Fixing the Jury System, CAL. Crnm. DEF. PRAc. REp., Dec.
1994, 487 ("The argument [against peremptories] would make more sense if the
threshold of challenges for cause were correspondingly loosened.").
204. Interview with Judge William Huss, supra note 5. But see HANs & VmiAR, supra
note 12, at 76 ("[L]awyers' instincts are often the least trustworthy basis on which
to pick jurors.")(quoting Alan Dershowitz).
205. Interview with Judge William Huss, supra note 5 (explaining that peremptories
eliminate jurors in danger of knowing so much that they become the "Lord Chief
Justice of the jury room," and that it is impossible to keep all of the bright, atten-
tive people off juries, so that there are always competent jurors).
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cess.2 06 Both Abramson and Adler develop thoughtful critiques of the
use of peremptory challenges, but neither addresses the specter of a
verdict by jurors who appear unfair. Perhaps the best solution is to
limit peremptories to strike a more even balance between the commu-
nity's interest in a purely representative jury and the defendant's
right to eliminate biased jurors. Babcock suggests reforming per-
emptories systematically by broadening the jury pool, reducing the
number of peremptories, tailoring juror questionnaires to individual
cases, preceding voir dire with opening statements, and affirmatively
selecting jurors rather than exercising challenges.207 As Babcock
urges, we should "expand" and elevate jury selection procedures to
"preserve the peremptory challenge while eliminating its excesses."208
B. Instructions
The jury's problems with understanding the law often arise from
the confusing instructions they receive rather than the jury's incompe-
tence.209 The principle of lay people resolving disputes makes sense
only if they are given accurate information with which to make their
decisions. Peter Meijes Tiersma offers an analogy that illustrates the
problems with many current jury instructions:
Imagine a tax class at a law school in which the entire course consists of a
verbatim reading of the Internal Revenue Code. Students are not told that
they have the right to ask questions, and the formal atmosphere of the class
does not encourage them to do so. When one summons the courage to pose a
question, the professor responds by rereading the entire lecture word for
word, so as not to draw undue emphasis to any particular section of the Code.
He refuses to give students a copy of the Code or to provide any examples or
illustrations that might help them understand how the Code works in prac-
206. See Babcock, supra note 195, at 1176 ("Although the Supreme Court disallows
race as a reason for striking jurors, and should forbid female gender as an expla-
nation also, it does not follow that litigants must relinquish all sense of choice
over their shared juries.").
207. Id. at 1176-79.
208. Id. at 1180.
209. HANs & VMAR, supra note 12, at 126 (explaining that juror comprehension
problems stem at least in part from the form and delivery of the instructions).
See also SAUL KAssiN & LAWRENCE S. WhiGHTSmAN, THE AmERICAN JURY ON
TRiAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPEcTVES 149 (1988)("[T]he problem is not jury com-
prehension, but the comprehensibility of judges' instructions."). See generally
Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury
Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Pro-
ject, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 401 (citing data to support the view that jurors do not
completely understand judicial instructions); Walter W. Steele & Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C.L.
ltv. 77 (1988)(reporting that jurors conscientiously try to follow their instruc-
tions, but that they cannot understand most of them).
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tice; he also forbids the students to do outside research. Then he hands out
the final examination. 2 10
Jury instructions reflect a tension between communicating standards
in a comprehensible manner and ensuring technical completeness to
withstand appellate review.21 1 The technical side of the scale usually
outweighs comprehension because the drafters of instructions are al-
ways repeat players in the system. As a result, jurors rarely can un-
derstand them and they take on responsibility without the tools to
exercise it wisely or correctly. Terms such as "liability," 'Inference,"
"immaterial," and "preponderance" are self-evident to lawyers but baf-
fle jurors.21 2 Judge Jerome Frank characterized the phenomenon of
jury instructions as a central flaw of the jury trial,23 and many com-
mentators have asserted that judges could give simpler instruc-
tions.2 14 Not only should the language of instructions be simplified,
210. Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 37,39-40 (1993). This article includes a useful discussion of the linguistic
basis for arguingjury instructions are often incomprehensible. Victor Villasenor
also notes a juror's reactions to a judge's instructions during deliberations in a
multiple murder case:
I would like to talk about this first part of what the Judge said because
... the second part of the instruction the Judge read was not only redun-
dant of this first part but it was in fact.., a negative statement. And as
a teacher I'll tell you, to use a negative to try to define something is like
saying a horse is a horse because it's not an elephant and, I'll tell you,
not only does this tend to mislead, but it's not proper. Oh, I'd like to give
those men who wrote these legal books a piece of my mind.
VICTOR VnLASESOR, JURY, THE PEoPLE vs. J"v CoRoNA 235 (1977).
211. A sample instruction underscores the complications:
One test that is helpful in determining whether or not a person was neg-
ligent is to ask and answer whether or not, if a person of ordinary pru-
dence had been in the same situation and possessed of the same
knowledge, he would have foreseen or anticipated that someone might
have been injured as a result of his action or inaction.
HANs & Vm AR, supra note 12, at 121 (quoting California Instruction BAJI 3.11).
212. ADLER, supra note 4, at 231. See also id. at 225-26, quoting from MARY TMoTH,
JuRY Wom 127-28 (1974), in which the forewoman of the Angela Davis jury
recalled: "Everyone else in the courtroom knew his or her job. They knew what
they were doing-everyone except us. We were overwhelmed."
213. See JFaoma FRANi, LAw AND inn MODERN M D 195 (Anchor Books ed., 1970)
(1930) ("What a crop of subsidiary semi-myths and mythical practices the jury
system yields! Time and money and lives are consumed in debating the precise
words which the judge may address to the jury, although everyone who stops to
see and think knows that these words might as well be spoken in a foreign lan-
guage ... ").
214. See KAssin & WRIGTsmAN, supra note 209, at 152 (quoting Kenneth Galbraith:
"[Tihere are no important propositions that cannot be stated in plain language.");
Laurence J. Severance, et al. Criminology: Toward Criminal Jury Instructions
that Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CEmI. L. & Criminology 198, 233 (1984) (sug-
gesting drafting principles to improve the clarity of criminal jury instructions and
finding that "simplified language and organized presentations of legal concepts




but there is no reason why they cannot be given to the jurors at an
earlier point in the trial.215 Judges could also instruct jurors daily on
the evidence issues relevant to that day's testimony.216 Furthermore,
many instructions require jurors to wipe facts they cannot possibly
forget from their minds. Jurors schematize information into stories
that they supplement with their own experience and common
sense.2 17 Early, clear instructions about the salient points of the trial
might help them construct the story that answers the questions posed
in the trial.
Despite the fact that recent research reveals that instructions
could be rewritten to increase juror comprehension, "overwhelming
forces" support the status quo. 21 8 The bar and jurors operate in com-
peting linguistic universes, and the urgency of the need to rewrite the
instructions often escapes the lawyers and judges who are accustomed
to them. Judges and lawyers reside inside the system and cannot
hear the instructions as a juror would. The complexity of the law
makes it difficult to rewrite the instructions, and most states have de-
parted from the principle of allowing the judge to comment to the ju-
rors on the evidence.219 Furthermore, the judges and both parties
contribute to the drafting of jury instructions and the form they take
215. No law prevents judges from instructing early in the trial, but instructions are
often delayed to afford lawyers an opportunity to change theories midtrial and to
allow judges to begin trials with minimal preparation. See ADLER, supra note 4,
at 227-28 ("What manner of mind can go back over a stream of conflicting state-
ments of alleged facts, recall the intonations, the demeanor, or even the existence
of the witnesses, and retrospectively fit all these recollections into a pattern of
evaluation and judgment given him for the first time after the events?") (quoting
E. Barrett Prettyman, Jury Instructions-First or Last?, 46 A.B.A. J. 1066
(1960)). See also William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. Cm.
119, 130 ("[J]urors arrive at tentative opinions in the case early in the trial, re-
gardless of whether they are preinstructed. The benefits of improved comprehen-
sion outweigh any concern over such tentative opinions."); Dann, supra note 192,
at 1249 n.134 (outlining the arguments against early instructions, including that
they make jurors take too narrow of a perspective). But see KAssIN & WIUGH'rs-
mmAT, supra note 209, at 132, 135-36, 145 (noting evidence that jurors arrive at
tentative opinions early in the trial, whether or not they are preinstructed).
216. See Schwarzer, supra note 215, at 132 (encouraging judges to use their authority
to comment on the evidence in complex cases so long as they do not improperly
influence the jury, and citing Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469-70
(1933)). See also Hans Zeisel, Forward to HANs & Vmmm, supra note 12, at 6
("[Judges] could instruct the jury not only at the end of the trial but also at its
outset, perhaps even every morning, on the issues in the evidence they will hear
that day.").
217. Daniel Goleman, Jurors Hear Evidence and Turn It into Stories, N.Y. Tnwxs, May
12, 1992, at C1 (quoting Dr. Nancy Pennington, a psychologist at the University
of Colorado: "People don't listen to all the evidence and then weigh it at the
end .... They process it as they go along, composing a continuing story throughout
the trial that makes sense of what they're hearing.").
218. See Steele & Thornburg, supra note 209, at 98.
219. See id. at 102.
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often reflects this adversarial drafing.220 Steele and Thornburg rec-
ommend two basic changes in the drafting of instructions that would
improve their comprehensibility: Lawyers and judges drafting the in-
structions should focus on a clear statement of the law rather than
stating it in all of its minute detail; and lay persons should be on the
committees drafting the instructions.221 Without clear instructions
about how to process the information they absorb during the trial, ju-
rors cannot fulfill their obligations either to the defendant or to the
community they represent. Close attention to drafting comprehensi-
ble instructions is one incremental reform that could improve both the
experience of jurors and the defensibility of the verdicts they produce.
C. Jury-Centric Courtrooms
Jurors often feel external to the process they are supposed to pro-
tect because of the overwhelming technicalities of the trial and the
formally delineated roles in the courtroom. A recent ABA report con-
cludes that "many jurors were confused, misunderstood the instruc-
tions, failed to recall evidence, and suffered enormously from boredom
and frustration."222 These findings point to a fundamental problem
with the structure of the courtroom. Adler approvingly cites the jury-
centric courtroom of Judge Michael Dann in Arizona. Judge Dann as-
serts that "Wlurors must be allowed greater roles in trials if juries are
to remain up to the task of resolving today's disputes and if the insti-
tution of trial by jury is to retain its vitality."223 In addition to giving
instructions ahead of time, Judge Dann experiments with the concept
of an inquisitive jury that not only takes notes but suggests and asks
questions. He also puts the upcoming legal issues in context for the
jurors with a preliminary instruction introducing them to court
procedures.224
Judge Dann's innovations are reminiscent of the origin of the jury
as both a deliberative and an investigative body. Contemporary jurors
do not bring knowledge of the defendant to the trial, but they take an
active role in sifting through the relevant facts. That inquisitive role
is in accord with the modern understanding of how people process in-
formation. 225 Assessments of the "active" jury depend on the degree of
220. See id. at 105.
221. Id. at 106-07.
222. ADLER, supra note 4, at 46 (quoting Daniel H. Margolis, Jury Comprehension in
Complex Cases: Report of the Special Committee on Jury Comprehension of the
ABA Section of Litigation (December 1989)).
223. Dann, supra note 192, at 1230.
224. See ADLnE, supra note 4, at 229. Adler also analyzes how the ability to ask ques-
tions might have affected the jury deliberations he criticizes in his book. See id.
at 235-38.
225. See Josh Meyer, Small Vanguard Presses its Case for Jury Reforms, LA. Tmnms,
September 28, 1994, at Al, A12. See also Dann, supra note 192, at 1238 (quoting
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"initiation" commentators think judicial actors should have.2 26
Although the jury is a democratic institution, not everyone in the
courtroom has equal speaking rights, and the controls on what the
players say strikes a balance essential to the adversary process. If
juries can affect the pace of the trial directly, they can disrupt a sys-
tem that allows lawyers to routinely hide the ball. The debate about
these incremental reforms therefore cuts to the heart of questions
about the adversary process. 227 Advocates of juror questions assert
that jurors will be able to clarify evidence, lawyers will be alerted to
issues that need further development, and jury deliberations will be
better informed and more confident.228 Lawyers, however, do not rec-
ognize jurors as the most important players in the courtroom; they
prefer to control the content and pace of the trial. Most judicial "insid-
ers" also fear that juries would ask irrelevant and misleading ques-
tions that would delay the trial and derail the subsequent
deliberations. 229 All federal and state courts except Texas courts al-
low jury questioning in one form or another,230 but it meets with criti-
ARTHuR D. AuSTiN, COMPLEX LITrGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYS=M 101
(1984): Allowing jurors to ask questions would include procedures to allow law-
yers to challenge the questions or alter them outside the presence of the jury.
"The traditional advocacy mentality is inconsistent with comprehension."). See
ADLER, supra note 4, at 237-38.
226. See Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge's Perspective on Providing Tools for Rational
Jury Decisionmaking, 85 NW. U. L. Rlv. 221, 222 (1990)(identifying three
sources of juror passivity: (1) the inertia of legal tradition, (2) a basic distrust of
juries, and (3) the attorneys' and judges' fears about losing control of the process).
See also Schwarzer, supra note 215, at 133 ("Our legal system's single-minded
devotion to a somewhat mechanistic notion of 'fairness' has led us to keep from
the jury important information that we fear might have an improper effect on the
verdict.").
227. See, e.g., Minow & Cate, supra note 35, at 656 (explaining that our system en-
courages lawyers to conceal evidence and try to deceive, or at least manipulate,
the jury).
228. See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror's Participation in Tri-
als: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAw &
Hum. BEHAv. 231, 233-34 (1988).
229. Interview with Judge William Huss, supra note 5 (suggesting that only the most
talkative jurors will ask questions and that most of those will be irrelevant, and
hesitating to "invite time-consuming nonsense"). See also Marshall, supra note
193, at 153 (stating that lawyers generally know the information the jury needs
and the order in which to present it most effectively). Nasheri and Rudolph iden-
tify six major objections to allowing jurors to ask questions: (1) jurors will ask
improper and prejudicial questions; (2) counsel will be reluctant to object to their
questions; (3) active jurors will lose their objectivity; (4) jurors will place too
much emphasis on the answers to their own questions; (5) jurors who are active
during the trial will dominate deliberations; and (6) jury questioning procedures
will disrupt the courtroom proceedings. Hedieh Nasheri & Richard J. Rudolph,
An Active Jury: Should Courts Encourage Jurors to Participate in the Question-
ing Process?, 16 Am. J. TIAL Avoc. 109, 118 (1992).
230. Note, Jurors May Not Pose Written Questions to Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 24
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1421, 1425 (1993) (citing cases in federal and state courts). Fed-
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cism from judges and practitioners who fear premature deliberation
and see a danger of prejudicing the jury or the parties. 231
Although allowing jurors to ask questions would upset the balance
of power in the courtroom and could distract other jurors from the im-
portant facts, juror questions could also give the attorneys and the
judge some guidance about how the trial is proceeding and how much
the jurors comprehend. Without answering direct questions, the play-
ers in the courtroom could be responsive to juror confusion if they
were alerted to it. For example, in the Marcos trial that Adler de-
scribes, the attorneys could have addressed the question of why the
case was being tried in the United States if the jurors had had the
opportunity to ask. In the Liggett trial in which the jurors were con-
fused about the baseline antitrust laws while the lawyers were specu-
lating among themselves about whether the jury was accepting novel
theories, the whole process would have benefited from an open admis-
sion that several complex issues had eluded the jurors.
Allowing jurors to take notes is less controversial, and, although
some judges express concern that it inhibits jurors' focus on the de-
meanor of witnesses and allows notetaking jurors to control delibera-
tions, few prohibit it.232 A jury-centric courtroom also would correct
for some of the unappealing circumstances of jury service, perhaps
even compensating jurors enough to make service feasible for a wider
variety of people. Judge Dann further advocates case-specific juror
orientation, preliminary jury instructions, interim summaries, writ-
ten copies of final instructions, discussions of the evidence among ju-
rors during the trial, and court interaction with deliberating jurors at
or near an impasse.233 Although jurors asking questions may pose
eral courts have allowed jurors to question witnesses since. 1954. Jeffrey S.
Berkowitz, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors Be Allowed to Question Witnesses
During Trial?, 44 V.r-. L. Rlv. 117, 118 n.4 (1991). The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence also provide some guidance on whether judges can permit jurors to ask
questions. The trial judge has the authority to "exercise reasonable control over
the mode and order of interrogating witnesses." FED. R. Evm. 611(a).
231. See Dann, supra note 192, at 1244 (Trial lawyers are invested in the customs and
rituals that severely limit juror participation in the trial.). See also Berkowitz,
supra note 230, at 147 (arguing that despite the benefits of jury questions they
should be abandoned because of the danger to juror neutrality).
232. Adler offers a compelling example in his account of the Liggett trial of the utility
of notetaking. The foreman reported that he struggled to keep the witnesses'
testimony in his head while he watched the judge and lawyers scribbling fever-
ishly on their own notepads. ADLER, supra note 4, at 239. See also Dann, supra
note 192, at 1251 (pointing out that everyone else in the courtroom is taking
notes in order to remember what is important); Heuer & Penrod, supra note 228,
at 232-236 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of juror notetaking);
Schwarzer, supra note 215, at 138-39 (stating that notetaking is now widely ac-
cepted and explaining that jurors who take notes will be forced to concentrate
and focus on what they hear).
233. See generally Dann, supra note 192 (discussing these reforms).
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significant risks, more modest reforms like summaries of the evidence,
notetaking, and clear instructions only track the ways people learn
and understand new data. Studies of jury behavior illustrate the
boredom and frustration that often accompany jury service, 234 and an
effort to remedy that situation can only improve the quality of jury
deliberations and the legitimacy of the verdicts that result.
D. Unanimity
The decline of the unanimous verdict, identified by Abramson as a
devaluation of the deliberative ideal, could diminish the power of mi-
nority or dissenting voices on the jury. Justice Stewart's dissent in
Apodaca v. Oregon states that nonunanimous verdicts could corrode
the community's confidence in the system if verdicts track racial or
other divisions on the jury.23 5 Social scientists assert that the major-
ity will not live up to the ideal of rational deliberation with the minor-
ity in the absence of the unanimity requirement. 23 6 Representation
on the jury might then include the right to be heard, but not the right
to influence the outcome of deliberations. The public would not accept
majority verdicts as equally reliable, particularly if they are unpopu-
lar verdicts, and the shift would undermine the legitimacy of the
system.
If the jury followed a legislative model, judges would never seques-
ter jurors or try to limit their exposure to pretrial publicity; they
would encourage jurors to communicate with the constituents they
supposedly represent. All nine Justices recognize in the unanimity
cases that jury deliberations differ from other democratic processes,
but they disagree on whether unanimity is necessary to that differ-
ence.23 7 The debate, according to data on jury decisionmaking, will
have a greater impact on the symbolism of the jury's deliberations
than on the outcome. Kalven and Zeisel report that the initial major-
ity prevails ninety percent of the time in deliberations. The ten per-
cent of the cases in which the minority turned the majority around,
however, may be the closest and most important cases. Even though
234. See Panel Two, supra note 56, at 574 (quoting a poem written by one juror during
trial: "Oh, give me a break. Just a ten-minute break.... Oh, give me a chance to
get up and dance. I long for the door. It is such a bore.").
235. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)(It does not denigrate the system of trial
by jury to acknowledge that it is imperfect... [Unanimity is] a necessary and
effective method endorsed by centuries of experience and history to combat the
injuries to the fair administration of justice that can be inflicted by community
passion and prejudice.")(Stewart, J., dissenting).
236. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 199 (reporting study proving that jury deliberations
are shorter when they do not require unanimity); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972)(stating that under a majority verdict, deliberation could be cut off
before dissenters had time to argue for their doubts)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
237. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 192.
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most recent studies show that the ratio of conviction to acquittal
would not change as a result of nonunanimous verdicts, jurors re-
turning majority verdicts feel less certain of their decision than their
counterparts on unanimous juries,23 8 and that could lead to a corre-
sponding decline in public confidence. The argument in favor of ma-
jority verdicts emphasizes efficiency,239 while the argument for
unanimity focuses on certainty. Ultimately, unanimity supports the
legitimacy of the verdict, particularly if majority verdicts break down
along racial lines. A high profile case resolved by a majority verdict of
10-2, if two members of the jury were of the same race as the defend-
ant, would be greeted by both the court and the public as an illegiti-
mate decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both Abramson and Adler leave the reader with the feeling that
the jury, like democracy, is "the worst of all systems-except for all
the others."2 40 They conclude that, despite its flaws, the jury is worth
preserving. Abramson stresses that the problems of the jury, as well
as its strengths, arise from its democratic foundations. Like all demo-
cratic institutions, the jury can be reevaluated. It may need to adapt
to the challenges of the diverse community it serves and the increas-
ing complexity of its task. The jury represents a delicate and problem-
atic balance that is often upset by the competing variables in high
proffle trials. But the jury lies at the heart of the rule of law, not
outside of it, because it is a "daring effort in human arrangement to
work out a solution to the tensions between law and equity and
anarchy."2 4 1
At a time when citizens grow increasingly skeptical about their
justice system, the role of the jury must be rejuvenated to ensure pub-
lic participation and improve perceptions of the process. As long as
the jury continues to balance the interests of the individual and the
community, it will remain the centerpiece of American democracy.
Each controversial case and each social science development will raise
new questions and suggest further reforms, but they should not erode
the democratic foundations of our justice system. We will continue to
witness extraordinary and challenging verdicts, but the jury will also
quietly dispense justice that complies with our national ideals of the
238. Id. at 200.
239. The Court accepted a development favoring efficiency over legitimacy, and under-
mining the deliberative ideal, when it concluded that the Constitution does not
require twelve jurors in state criminal trials. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
240. DERSHOWrrZ, supra note 92 at 11-13 (quoting Winston Churchill's famous de-
scription of democracy).
241. KAL V N & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 499.
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rule of law. Abramson and Adler's books are a masterful first strike in
the struggle that has intensified since the verdict in the Simpson trial.
They elevate the debate about the jury to a level above tabloid journal-
ism and political reaction. The reasoned arguments for both preserva-
tion and change that Abramson and Adler make should help to
counter the rush to dismantle this most American of institutions.
